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This is the fifty-fourth in a series of Installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the global Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). A number of recent Installments in this series, such as Installment 52 and, earlier, Installment 17 have used public filings and media publications to highlight the apparently inconsistent and peremptory approach that Irving Picard, the Trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy (“Picard”) has taken with respect to the Wilpon/Katz families, the owners of the New York Mets, and their Section 501(c)(3) private foundations (collectively, “Wilpon/Katz”), in contrast to other charitable organizations.

Now, however, there will be a new playing field and environment to be confronted by Mr. Picard and his army of attorneys in his crusade against the Wilpon/Katz families. In contrast to the friendly home field advantage for Mr. Picard in the bankruptcy court, Judge Jed S. Rakoff, a Federal District Court judge in Manhattan, has taken jurisdiction of the Wilpon/Katz matter. A July 6, 2011 article by Richard Sandomir in The New York Times characterized Judge Rakoff as

a former federal prosecutor and defense lawyer with an independent streak and a flair for phrase-making. He has been called an activist judge. He has been called a maverick. He has been called other things, a number of them probably unprintable. But few observers of the federal bench would dispute that he is capable of the unexpected.

The article by Mr. Sandomir goes on to say that “lawyers familiar with Rakoff and his appetite for novel rulings said this week that they would not be shocked if he tried try to say something larger about the law.” Indeed Judge Rakoff indicated some skepticism as to “a question that is critical to Katz and Wilpon’s case. How, he wondered, can investors like them not be judged by the securities laws that governed their 25 years of investing with Madoff, but by the bankruptcy laws that came into play after Madoff’s collapse.”

It is clear that Judge Rakoff may bring a bold new and perhaps refreshing and enlightening direction to the Wilpon/Katz matter. He does not appear to be willing to limit his review to the scope that has been so far carefully defined by Mr. Picard and the bankruptcy court. His involvement may have significant impact on the entire Madoff case. It is hoped that an enlarged field of inquiry by Judge Rakoff will address some of the peremptory and perplexing decisions of Mr. Picard in the Madoff bankruptcy that appear to be inconsistent and perhaps even unfair.

[To be continued in Installment 55].

(Michael J. Kline, the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the fifty-third in a series of Installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the global Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Installments 51 and 52  and earlier Installments of this series have discussed the apparently inconsistent and peremptory approach that Irving Picard, the Trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy (“Picard”) has taken with respect to the Wilpon/Katz families, the owners of the New York Mets, and their Section 501(c)(3) private foundations (collectively, the “Wilpon/Katz Families”), in contrast to the Lautenberg Foundation, a Section 501(c)(3) private foundation (“Lautenberg”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg.

As early as Installment 17 this series raised the question as to whether the Wilpons would be treated differently from Hadassah and other charities by Picard. There has been continuing publicity regarding the spectacle of the Wilpon/Katz Families v. Picard.

In Installment 52, this series observed the following:

Thus it would appear that Picard has made peremptory and perplexing decisions not only as to the Madoff investors that he has chosen to pursue but also the extent of recoveries that he is seeking. While the Wilpon/Katz families, including the Wilpon/Katz Foundations, will spend millions of dollars in legal fees and most likely hundreds of millions in settlement or satisfaction of judgments, other Madoff investors like Hadassah and the Lautenberg Foundation will keep millions in fictitious profits or even recover payments in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding.

Recently, I had the privilege and pleasure of hearing Jeffrey Toobin, a senior analyst for CNN Worldwide since 2003 and a staff writer at The New Yorker since 1993, who is one of the country’s most esteemed experts and authors on politics, media and the law, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. His book “The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (2007),” was highly acclaimed. Mr. Toobin’s forthcoming book, “The Oath: The Secret Struggle for the Supreme Court,” will be published in 2012. He was the featured speaker on the subject of the U.S. Supreme Court at a luncheon during the partners’ retreat of my law firm earlier this month. Because I knew of Mr. Toobin’s interest and fan support of the New York Mets, I asked him a question about Picard and the Wilpon/Katz Families.

I inquired whether he thought that the aggressive and somewhat incongruous approach taken by Picard against the Wilpon/Katz Families in seeking not only fictitious profits but also principal was part of a larger strategy of Picard to use a success in recovering more than fictitious profits from these highly visible and vulnerable victims as a segue and steppingstone to his attacks on JPMorgan Chase, HSBC and other institutions.

Mr. Toobin responded that he believed that Picard is treating the Wilpon/Katz Families quite unfairly and manifestly different from other individual investors with Madoff. He added that it is possible that Picard is using the case of the Wilpon/Katz Families to set a precedent of a recovery in excess of fictitious profits to use in cases of banks that have much more financial ability to oppose Picard for an extended period of time. Mr. Toobin added that, based on published information, it appeared that the banks should have known that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme.

I extend my thanks to Mr. Toobin for his response.

[To be continued in Installment 54]
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the fifty-second in a series of installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the global Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Installment 51 of this series presented a tabular comparison of financial information derived from the 2007, 2008 and 2009 Forms 990-PF filed with the Internal Revenue Service by (i) The Lautenberg Foundation, a Section 501(c)(3) private foundation (“Lautenberg”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and (ii) the Section 501(c)(3) private foundations formed by the owners of the New York Mets: the Judy & Fred Wilpon Family Foundation, Inc., and the Iris & Saul Katz Family Foundation, Inc. (collectively, the “Wilpon/Katz Foundations”). (The Lautenberg Foundation and the Wilpon/Katz Foundations are sometimes collectively referred to herein as the “Foundations.”)

The table in Installment 51 shows that the Lautenberg Foundation and the Wilpon/Katz Foundations suffered crushing losses in fair market value of assets from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009. During that two year period each of the Foundations lost at least 80% of its fair market value of assets as a result of write-offs attributable to the revelations regarding Madoff. In addition, each of the Foundations saw disastrous losses or declines in investment income during 2008 and 2009 from the level achieved in 2007 as a result of the losses recognized from investments with Madoff.

The Form 990-PF filed by each of the Foundations for 2007 (the last full fiscal year for the Foundations before the Madoff scandal erupted in December 2008) indicated that an appreciable portion of income and contributions reflected for that year were attributable to the fictitious profits from investments with Madoff and distributions from such “profits” to the Foundation. The largest amount of Madoff "profits" so reflected for 2007 was $947,565 that was reported by the Lautenberg Foundation.

While Picard continues his relentless pursuit of the Wilpon/Katz families, including the Wilpon/Katz Foundations for not only “clawback” of $300 million of fictitious profits but also return of principal of $700 million, there is no such pursuit of the Lautenberg Foundation, even for clawback. Moreover, there is even evidence (while not conclusive because of a lack of an explanatory note) in the 2009 Form 990-PF filed by the Lautenberg Foundation that it received a cash recovery of $500,000 in the Madoff proceeding. See Installment 50 of this series for further discussion.

Thus it would appear that Picard has made peremptory and perplexing decisions not only as to the Madoff investors that he has chosen to pursue but also the extent of recoveries that he is seeking. While the Wilpon/Katz families, including the Wilpon/Katz Foundations, will spend millions of dollars in legal fees and most likely hundreds of millions in settlement or satisfaction of judgments, other Madoff investors like Hadassah and the Lautenberg Foundation will keep millions in fictitious profits or even recover payments in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding.

[To be continued in Installment 53]
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the fifty-first in a series of installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”).  Installments 49 and Installment 50 of this series and several prior Installments have discussed The Lautenberg Foundation, a private foundation (“Lautenberg”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and its investment with Madoff.  

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