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Michael J. Kline writes:

This blog series has often used Forms 990 and Forms 990-PF filed with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) by public charities and private foundations, respectively, which have been victims in the Ponzi schemes of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) and others, to highlight areas where improvement in compliance may be undertaken. For example, a previous blog entry pointed out that there is evidence that some charities may be exercising greater caution in their gift acceptance policies as a result of having suffered from involvement with Ponzi schemes.  

This posting will address the question of what officer should sign the Form 990 in light of the requirements of the IRS contained in the Form 990 itself and the IRS Instructions for Form 990 (the “IRS Instructions”). The Form 990 Signature Block at the bottom of the first page states the following, which is substantially the same language as is present in income tax returns for individuals and business corporations:

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct and complete.

The IRS Instructions add the following further requirements as to the Signature Block: 

The return must be signed by the current president, vice president, treasurer, assistant treasurer, chief accounting officer, or other corporate officer (such as tax officer) who is authorized to sign as of the date this return is filed [Emphasis supplied] . . . . The definition of "officer" for purposes of Part II is different from the definition of officer (see Glossary) used to determine which officers to report elsewhere on the form and schedules, and from the definition of principal officer for purposes of the Form 990 Heading (see Glossary).

This is a very serious standard and a high bar for the officer executing the Form 990 to achieve. As early as February 2010, this blog series recognized the diverse and somewhat perplexing nature of the individuals who signed Forms 990 on behalf of two charities that were victims of Madoff: Yeshiva University and Hadassah.   In the case of Yeshiva University, its Vice President and CFO, who was a compensated full-time employee, executed the Form 990. On the other hand, the National Treasurer of Hadassah, who sign its Form 990 contemporaneously with the Yeshiva filing, appeared to be an uncompensated volunteer and reflected less than 10 hours per week of time for Hadassah. 

Query: should a volunteer officer who devotes relatively little time to the charity be undertaking the responsibility to sign for a charity of the international scope of Hadassah? Would not the CFO or other full-time compensated officer of Hadassah be more appropriate for the task? (While the uncompensated National Treasurer of Hadassah again signed its 2011 Form 990, such Form 990 does indicate that she devotes 34.00 hours per week to Hadassah.)

Below are some concepts that charities and their officers should consider in determining who should sign their 2012 Forms 990. Subject to the size and human and financial resources available to a charity, the officer who executes the Form 990 should be one who

1. can demonstrate active input and involvement in the Form 990 and financial statement preparation process;

2. has the skill and experience to evaluate personally the quality of the preparation process for both the financial statements and the governance, management, policies and disclosure portions of the Form 990;

3.  holds such a position that his/her input will be meaningfully received by the other internal and external preparers of the Form 990;

4. understands and is comfortable with the seriousness of signing the Form 990 on the basis that it is true, correct and complete and executed under penalty of perjury; and

5.  is authorized to sign. 

While I believe that item 5 has been rarely done on a formal basis by charities, the formal granting of authority to sign the Form 990 will assist the governing body and the executing officer in comprehending the gravity of the Form 990, its filing with the IRS and universal availability on the Internet.

(Michael J. Kline, the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

[To be continued in Installment 89]

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Michael J. Kline writes:

It is perplexing that Forms 990-PF for 2011 (“2011 Forms 990-PF”) filed with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) by various Wilpon family private foundations (the “Schedule 1 Foundations”), which are now beginning to appear on GuideStar, provide no reference to the assignment to Madoff Trustee Irving Picard of allowed net equity claims. While only two of the six Schedule 1 Foundations have had their 2011 Forms 990-PF posted on GuideStar to date, each of them has chosen to omit any reference to encumbering their “Estimated SIPC Recovery – Madoff Theft Loss,” even though such 2011 Forms 990-PF were filed after the execution of the Settlement Agreement, dated April 13, 2012, between Picard and the Wilpons (the “Settlement Agreement”), that was approved by the Federal District Court on May 31, 2012.

This blog series, particularly Installments 75 and 76 and prior Installments referred to therein, has been monitoring the participation by the Schedule 1 Foundations in the global Settlement Agreement.   (Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings assigned to them in Installment 76.)   

The Schedule 1 Foundations for which 2011 Forms 990-PF have been posted to date on GuideStar are The Tepper Family Foundation (the “Tepper Foundation”) and the Valerie and Jeffrey S. Wilpon Foundation (the “JW Foundation” and, collectively with the Tepper Foundation, the “Posted Foundations”).  Notably, each of the Schedule 1 Foundations, including the Posted Foundations, has one or more Fiduciary Defendants who, in one capacity and/or another, was (i) a defendant in the Wilpon Litigation, (ii) listed on Schedule 2 to the Settlement Agreement as a recipient of transfers from Madoff in excess of principal invested and (iii) a signatory to the Settlement Agreement. 

Each of the Schedule 1 Foundation Claims, which would otherwise be receivables payable in cash to the respective Schedule 1 Foundation as part of distributions by the Trustee, has been assigned to the Trustee and will, to some extent, fund a portion of the monetary clawback exposure of its respective Fiduciary Defendants. (The form of “Assignment of Net Equity Claims” (the “Assignment”) is the final page attached to the Settlement Agreement.)  Installment 76 went into some detail as to the problematic aspects of the participation by the Schedule 1 Foundations in the Settlement Agreement process and the question of potential prohibited “private benefit and inurement” under IRS rules. 

A number of observations can be made as to the 2011 Forms 990-PF of the Posted Foundations:

1.         Each of the 2011 Forms 990-PF of the Posted Foundations reflects on line 15 of its Part II Balance Sheet as a substantial “other asset” an item that is explained in a later statement as “Estimated SIPC Recovery – Madoff Theft Loss.” For the Tepper Foundation, the amount reflected is $47,093, and for the JW Foundation, the amount reflected is $137,690. However, by April 13, 2012, and prior to the time of filing with the IRS of their respective 2011 Forms 990-PF (June 25, 2012 as to the Tepper Foundation and May 16, 2012 as to the JW Foundation (collectively, the “Forms 990-PF Filing Dates”)), the Settlement Agreement had already been signed, and each of the Posted Foundations had agreed on a fixed amount for the Schedule 1 Foundation Claim at a materially lower figure than that reflected on the respective Form 990-PF.  The amount reflected and its percentage of the original estimate is $30,895 (65.6%) as to the Tepper Foundation and $70,050 (50.8%) as to the JW Foundation. It would appear that an explanation of the difference or substitution of the known agreed-upon figure would be better disclosure than continuing the higher estimated amount that the Posted Foundations had carried in their Forms 990-PF for several years.

2.         Neither of the 2011 Forms 990-PF of the Posted Foundations reflects any offset, encumbrance or liability, either in the Part II Balance Sheet or an explanatory statement, as to its having assigned its Schedule 1 Foundation Claim to the Trustee pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the Assignment, which were executed well before the Forms 990-PF Filing Dates. If the Posted Foundations reported the estimated Schedule 1 Foundation Claim as an asset on the accrual basis as discussed in item 1 above, it would appear that the Assignment should be reported as well, even if as a subsequent event statement.

3.         It is interesting that, while neither of the 2011 Forms 990-PF of the Posted Foundations evidences a “paid preparer” on page 13 (as is also the case for the 2010 Forms 990-PF of each of the Schedule 1 Foundations for that matter), each shares the same address, provides the identical reporting format for the Schedule 1 Foundation Claim and reflects no compensated employees. The IRS Instructions for Form 990-PF provide the following on page 30:   

Generally, anyone who is paid to prepare the organization’s tax return must sign the return and fill in the Paid Preparer Use Only area. An employee of the filing organization is not a paid preparer.

By implication, an employee of another entity who prepares the organization’s tax return may be a paid preparer. The Instructions do invite the organization to consult with the IRS as to whether a preparer is required to sign the return.

4.         In light of considerations such as those in items 1 through 3 above, an officer or trustee of a private foundation, such as the Presidents of the Posted Foundations, should be aware that he or she signs a Form 990-PF with the following affirmation:  

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct and complete.

Preparation of Forms 990-PF can be complex, especially when concerns may be potentially present about imposition of excise taxes, duty of loyalty, possible conflicts of interest of fiduciaries and the IRS rules regarding private benefit and inurement. Because the Forms 990-PF are permanently and universally available on the Internet, private foundations and their fiduciaries are well-advised to seek competent guidance and counsel in their preparation and filing.

Now that the November 15, 2012 final IRS filing date (including permitted extensions) for 2011 Forms 990-PF by calendar year foundations has passed, the 2011 Forms 990-PF of the remaining Schedule 1 Foundations should be appearing on GuideStar within the next several months. 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

[To be continued in Installment 88]

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Michael J. Kline writes:

There is evidence that some charities may be exercising greater caution in their gift acceptance policies as a result of the dramatic and sometimes devastating consequences that highly respected charities have suffered from involvement in the Ponzi schemes of Bernard L. Madoff (“Bernard”) and others.  It would appear that Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund of Boston, Massachusetts (“Fidelity”) has moved in that direction from actions it has taken respecting grants received from the private foundations formed by Bernard’s sons Andrew and Mark and their respective spouses. This blog series has been following for almost four years the misfortunes of charities flowing from involvement in  Ponzi schemes, and apparently some charities have responded to reduce exposure to potential risks in this area.

The Forms 990-PF for 2010 filed with the IRS and posted on GuideStar by the Deborah and Andrew Madoff Foundation (the “Andrew Foundation”) and the Mark and Stephanie Madoff Foundation (the “Mark Foundation,” and, collectively with the Andrew Foundation, the “Madoff Sons Foundations”) reveals that each of the Madoff Sons Foundations made grants to Fidelity in December 2010  $176,000 by the Andrew Foundation and $79,000 by the Mark Foundation. Andrew serves as a trustee of both of the Madoff Sons Foundations, as did Mark until his tragic death from an apparent suicide on December 11, 2010. The death of Mark was exactly two years to the day after Andrew and Mark turned their father Bernard over to authorities for arrest and was in the same month that the Madoff Sons Foundations made their respective grants to Fidelity. 

Each of the 2010 Forms 990-PF of the Madoff Sons Foundations contains the following “General Explanation Attachment”:

In December 2010, the Foundation made a grant of $ . . . to the Fidelity Charitable Gift Fund in order to satisfy its distribution requirements . . . [under IRS regulations]. In February 2011, such amount was returned to the Foundation by the charitable organization. The Foundation will reflect this amount . . . as a recovery of a qualifying distribution on its 2011 annual return.

Why did Fidelity return the money to the Madoff Sons Foundations in early 2011? Was it to avoid potential adverse publicity that could flow from continued association with the scandal-ridden Madoff name and the recent death of Mark? In this regard, the 2009 Form 990-PF of the Andrew Foundation (but not that of the Mark Foundation) reflected a grant on December 29, 2009 of $207,000 to Fidelity, already more than a year after the arrest of Bernard. However, Fidelity did not return the 2009 grant.

Alternatively, or in addition, could the return of the 2010 grant have resulted from a concern by Fidelity that, even though the funds in the Madoff Sons Foundations had not been invested in the Bernard scheme, the assets of the Madoff Sons Foundations were derived from contributions by Andrew and Mark and could possibly be traced to monies from the Bernard scandal? If that turned out to be the case, the grants may be subject to "clawback” by Irving Picard, the Trustee of the Bernard bankruptcy estate. Picard had already sued Andrew and Mark for millions of dollars that he alleged they received from the Bernard Ponzi scheme. 

This blog series has discussed the unfortunate experience of Malvern Preparatory School with a charitable pledge and grant from a donor/trustee who was later accused of operating a Ponzi scheme. The charitable pledge became worthless, and substantial grants already received by the School were recovered by the trustee in bankruptcy for the former donor/trustee who then was already in prison. 

(As an aside, it is interesting to note that, in contrast to the Madoff Sons Foundations, which did not invest in the Bernard Ponzi scheme, the now-defunct Bernard L. and Ruth Madoff Foundation did invest in the Bernard Ponzi scheme, according to GuideStar Form 990-PF postings.)

In this blog series, we have advocated that every charity should respond pro-actively in the wake of scandals involving the Bernard and other Ponzi schemes. Such actions include heightened transparency in disclosures in Forms 990, examination and upgrading of charitable gift acceptance policies and improvement of governance practices. It appears that Fidelity has already adopted some of these measures.  

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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Michael J. Kline writes:

There have been recent media reports respecting efforts of Trustee Irving Picard to make a substantial distribution of up to several billion dollars to Madoff victims in the near future. This Installment will discuss a potential impact that such a distribution may have on the diverse and somewhat divergent interests among the Wilpons that are parties to the global Settlement Agreement with Picard and how the Wilpons may address such an impact. 

Installments 75 and 76 in this blog series, which may be read for context with this Installment, discussed concerns about the inclusion of the Wilpons' private charitable Foundations in the Settlement Agreement. (Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings assigned to them in Installment 75.)  

Such earlier Installments focused on a possible dichotomy between the interests of the Foundations and the individuals who are their fiduciaries and suggested an analysis of (i) the duty of loyalty of such fiduciaries and (ii) their need to avoid conflicts of interest and prohibited “private benefit and inurement” under U.S. Treasury Regulations. What is clear is that many individual Wilpons beyond the Foundation Fiduciaries should be addressing concerns respecting potential duties of loyalty and the need to avoid conflicts of interest, including fiduciaries (collectively, “Fiduciaries”) of the numerous business entities, family trusts that may even include minors and unborn children as beneficiaries, estates and other entities or multi-party arrangements that are affected by the Settlement Agreement (collectively, the “Entities”). Numerous signatories of the Settlement Agreement were acting not only in their individual capacities, but as partners, officers, trustees, executors or members or in some other fiduciary capacity.

Simply stated, how can the Wilpons as a group fairly treat the Entities and individuals who are signatories to the Settlement Agreement and have been recognized by Picard (the “Allowed Parties”) to have $178 million in aggregate allowed net equity claims against the Madoff Estate (“Allowed Claims”)? The Allowed Parties would receive a pro rata share of future cash distributions to Madoff victims by Picard (“Picard Distributions”) but for the Settlement Agreement, which requires that Picard Distributions on account of the Allowed Claims will not be paid but will serve as offsets against the $162 million in aggregate Wilpon liabilities to the Madoff Estate (“Wilpon Liabilities”) by those of the Wilpons that had received six-year transfers from Madoff in excess of principal (“Wilpon Obligors”).

In reaching their global Settlement Agreement with Picard (which included representations by the Wilpon signatories that they had the right to execute and carry out the Settlement Agreement in their respective individual and fiduciary capacities), the Wilpons should have considered resolving potential duty of loyalty and conflicts of interest issues of the Fiduciaries. Otherwise there can be a myriad of future complaints from beneficiaries of Entities, especially those of the Allowed Entities, that their Picard Distributions should not have been used for the benefit of the Wilpon Obligors to pay for Wilpon Liabilities. Additionally, destruction of numerous Wilpon estate and gifting plans and incurrence of gift tax exposure for certain of the Wilpons could result from the use of Allowed Claims to satisfy Wilpon Liabilities.

One way to have addressed such a complex and diverse situation would appear to be an agreement among all of the Wilpons similar to that of a “tax sharing agreement” (a sample appears here). A tax sharing agreement, as discussed in U.S. Treasury Regulations, allocates the federal income tax liability of individual members of a consolidated group for which a single tax return is filed and a single amount is paid to the Internal Revenue Service. Under a tax sharing agreement, each of the individual members of the consolidated group has its own tax obligation or tax loss calculated as if it were taxed separately and not as a member of the group. A member of the consolidated group that individually would have had a loss for tax purposes is entitled to compensation for the use of the loss to reduce the tax liability for the consolidated group. Conversely, a member of the group that individually would have had taxable income would be required to compensate another member(s) for using such other member’s loss to reduce or eliminate the tax liability of the consolidated group. Under the Treasury Regulations, if one member owes a payment to a second member, the first member is treated as indebted to the second member. If the obligation is not paid, the amount not paid generally is treated as a distribution, contribution, or both, depending on the relationship between the members.

Similarly, to avoid future uncertainties, the Wilpons could forge an agreement ( “Allocation Agreement”), with adequate advice of counsel for the involved parties, to provide a method for Allowed Entities to be compensated for the use of their Allowed Claims for the benefit of the Wilpons and the Wilpon Obligors to offset Wilpon Liabilities under the Settlement Agreement. The Allocation Agreement would reduce potential exposure of Fiduciaries to objections from beneficial holders of Allowed Claims that they were denied their cash Picard Distributions. However, if the Wilpon Obligors cannot or do not make immediate cash payments under an Allocation Agreement to Allowed Entities (and individuals with Allowed Claims) when Picard Distributions are made, the terms as to when and how deferred payments are to be made and provisions for any interest or other consideration for such deferrals can be problematic and complex.  

Payments among the Wilpons under such an Allocation Agreement could prove to be significant. While the Wilpons may have successfully limited their external cash outlays to the Madoff Estate under the Settlement Agreement with Picard, resolving rights and obligations among Allowed Parties and Wilpon Obligors could result in an appreciable shifting of assets among the Wilpons.

(Michael J. Kline, the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

[To be continued in Installment 83]

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Michael Kline writes:

This Installment raises some questions relating to the inclusion of the Defendant Foundations, which the Trustee had sued for recovery of “fictitious profits” and principal, as parties to the global Settlement Agreement between Picard and the Wilpons. Installment 75 (Part 1) of this blog series, which should be read together with this Installment, discussed the “Schedule 1 Foundations” and concerns about their inclusion in the Settlement Agreement. (Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings assigned to them in Installment 75.)   

Unlike the Schedule 1 Foundations, the Defendant Foundations are defendants in the Litigation, and each of them is a signatory to the Settlement Agreement, with Fred Wilpon having signed as Director for the Wilpon Family Foundation and Saul B. Katz having signed as Director for the Katz Family Foundation. Moreover, the Defendant Foundations are listed on Schedule 2 of the Settlement Agreement as recipients of transfers from Madoff in excess of principal, as are the other defendants in the Litigation. 

However, the fact that the Defendant Foundations are literally “on the same page” as the other defendants in the Litigation, including Fred Wilpon and Saul B. Katz as individuals defendants, should not finish the analysis as to whether the Defendant Foundations are properly parties to the Settlement Agreement. The analysis utilized in Installment 75 for the Schedule 1 Foundations should be considered for the Defendant Foundations as well.

Simply stated, there is a possible dichotomy between the interests of the Defendant Foundations and the individuals who occupy the same status with respect to the Defendant Foundations as the “Fiduciary Defendants” of the Schedule 1 Foundations. (Such individuals will be defined as Fiduciary Defendants with respect to the Defendant Foundations.) While more subtle in the case of the Defendant Foundations, there is a potential divergence of interests that calls for analysis of (i) the duty of loyalty of fiduciaries and (iii) the avoidance of conflicts of interest and prohibited “private benefit and inurement” that was discussed respecting the Schedule 1 Foundations.  To reiterate, as indicated in the IRS Compliance Guide,

A private foundation is prohibited from allowing more than an insubstantial accrual of benefits, including non-monetary benefits, to individuals or organizations. The intent is to ensure that a tax-exempt organization serves a public interest, not a private one. If a private benefit is substantial, it could jeopardize the organization’s tax-exempt status.

Excise taxes for such violations can also be imposed by the IRS on both the non-complying private foundation and its fiduciaries. Basically, the allegation could be made that the inclusion of the Defendant Foundations in the Settlement Agreement benefited on a monetary and/or a non-monetary basis their respective Fiduciary Defendants in settling the Litigation on the most favorable terms on a global basis. 

Query, did the Trustee and the Fiduciary Defendants explore reasonably the question as to whether the Defendant Foundations could have and should have made a better deal by themselves outside of the framework of the global Settlement Agreement? Installment 60 of this blog series (and prior Installments linked therein) give examples of the flexibility and financial accommodations that the Trustee has provided in other cases of charities that realized fictitious profits in the Madoff scheme and would have suffered serious or even irreparable adversity if they were to be fully clawed back.

In conclusion, in the cases of both the Schedule 1 Foundations and the Defendant Foundations, greater scrutiny of their participation in the Settlement Agreement may be called for in order to promote an appearance of propriety for the Settlement Agreement and the Fiduciary Defendants. In addition to the questions at the end of Installment 75, query whether the Trustee, as the party moving for approval of the Settlement Agreement, has a responsibility to be pro-actively bringing the matters of the Involved Foundations to the attention of Judge Rakoff for inclusion in the court’s full and fair review and approval of the Settlement Agreement in this widely-followed Litigation.

(Michael J. Kline, the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

(To be continued in Installment 77)

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Michael Kline writes:

This Installment addresses some of the effects on, and implications for, certain charitable private foundations (collectively, the “Involved Foundations”) and their respective officers, directors, trustees and foundation managers (collectively, the “Fiduciaries”) under the proposed settlement agreement dated April 13, 2012 (the “Settlement Agreement”), between Madoff Trustee Irving Picard and the numerous defendants, constituting the Wilpon-Katz-Mets individual, business, family trust and charitable interests (collectively, the “Wilpons”). Installment 74 and prior postings in this blog series discussed certain aspects of the Settlement Agreement. 

The Settlement Agreement, which would terminate all existing litigation between the Trustee and the Wilpons (the “Litigation”), is subject to the approval of Federal District Judge Jed S. Rakoff at a hearing scheduled for 4 PM on May 15, 2012.  Further information, including Forms 990-PF filed with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), respecting each of the Involved Foundations and their Fiduciaries may be found on the GuideStar Web site.

A recurring theme in this blog series has been the relatively inconsistent and sometimes perplexing manner in which the Trustee has dealt with charities that invested with Madoff. Installment 60 and prior Installments discussed some of the differences in the way Picard was dealing with the Judy & Fred Wilpon Family Foundation (the “Wilpon Family Foundation”) and the Iris & Saul Katz Family Foundation (the “Katz Family Foundation” and collectively with the Wilpon Family Foundation, the “Defendant Foundations”), as contrasted to other public charities and charitable private grant-making foundations. 

The Defendant Foundations are listed on Schedule 2 to the Settlement Agreement, which is the “Summary of Six-Year Transfers from BLMIS [Madoff] to Defendants in Excess of Principal,” respecting persons subject to “clawback” efforts by the Trustee of “fictitious profits” and principal. A number of the Fiduciaries of each of the Defendant Foundations also are defendants listed on Schedule 2 for whom the Trustee was seeking clawback. The Defendant Foundations will be discussed more fully in a future Installment in this blog series. 

The remaining Involved Foundations (the “Schedule 1 Foundations”) appear on Schedule 1 to the Settlement Agreement, which is the “Summary of Allowed Net Equity Claims Against the BLMIS Estate.” Therefore, the Schedule 1 Foundations are not defendants in the Litigation; nor are they signatories to the Settlement Agreement. They are claimants that have been recognized to be entitled to share in the funds recovered by the Trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy.

The Schedule 1 Foundations include, among others, The Dayle H & Michael Katz Foundation Inc. (the “Michael Katz Foundation"). Notably, each of the Schedule 1 Foundations has one or more Fiduciaries who, in one capacity and/or another, is (i) a defendant in the Litigation, (ii) listed on Schedule 2 to the Settlement Agreement and (iii) a signatory to the Settlement Agreement. The Foundation Fiduciaries of each of the Schedule 1 Foundations have an aggregate larger amount of clawback exposure on Schedule 2 than the allowed net equity claim of the related Schedule 1 Foundation (a “Schedule 1 Foundation Claim”). Except for the Michael Katz Foundation, the amount of  the Schedule 1 Foundation Claim of each Schedule 1 Foundation is relatively small, less than $100,000. In the case of the Michael Katz Foundation, however, the Schedule 1 Foundation Claim is $617,000, while the maximum aggregate exposure reflected on Schedule 2 for clawback against the Michael Katz Foundation Fiduciaries exceeds that amount.

In the Settlement Agreement, each Schedule 1 Foundation Claim falls within the definition of a “Defendant Net Equity Claim” under Section 1(c) of the Settlement Agreement. Each of the Fiduciaries who is also a signatory to the Settlement Agreement (a “Fiduciary Defendant”) is defined as a “Defendant” in the Settlement Agreement, who, under Section 2(a) of the Settlement Agreement, has agreed, among other things, to assign all Defendant Net Equity Claims (which would include a Schedule 1 Foundation Claim) to the Trustee.  In addition, each Fiduciary Defendant has represented and warranted under Section 6(b) of the Settlement Agreement that he or she has full power, authority and legal right to assign his or her respective Defendant Net Equity Claim (which would include a Schedule 1 Foundation Claim).

The foregoing acts by the Fiduciary Defendants may be problematic. In effect, each of the Schedule 1 Foundation Claims, which would otherwise be a future unencumbered expectancy to be paid to the respective Schedule 1 Foundation by the Trustee, is being assigned under the Settlement Agreement to the Trustee to fund a portion of the monetary clawback exposure of its respective Fiduciary Defendants.   As stated earlier, the Schedule 1 Foundations are not defendants in the Litigation; nor are they directly signatories to the Settlement Agreement.

This dichotomy between the interests of Schedule 1 Foundations and their respective Fiduciary Defendants sets up a classic divergence of interests that calls for consideration of compliance requirements flowing from the duty of loyalty of fiduciaries and the potential for conflicts of interest. Moreover, the question of potential prohibited “private benefit and inurement” respecting the Schedule 1 Foundations under IRS rules can be raised as indicated in an IRS Compliance Guide:

A private foundation is prohibited from allowing more than an insubstantial accrual of benefits, including non-monetary benefits, to individuals or organizations. The intent is to ensure that a tax-exempt organization serves a public interest, not a private one. If a private benefit is substantial, it could jeopardize the organization’s tax-exempt status.

In addition, no part of an organization’s net earnings may inure to the benefit of a private shareholder or individual. This means that an organization is prohibited from allowing its income or assets to accrue to insiders. An example of prohibited inure­ment would include payment of unreasonable compensation to an insider. An insider is a person such as an officer, director, or a key employee who has a personal or private interest in the activities of the organization. Any amount of inurement may be grounds for loss of tax-exempt status.

In addition to loss of the organization’s section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, activities constituting inurement may result in the imposition of self-dealing excise taxes on individuals benefiting from certain transactions with a private foundation.

The laws regarding duty of loyalty and conflicts of interest of fiduciaries and the IRS rules regarding private benefit and inurement are highly complex. Presumably, each of the Schedule 1 Foundations and its respective Fiduciaries would have been well advised to seek separate guidance and counsel as to their respective rights and obligations under the Settlement Agreement and its impact on a Schedule 1 Foundation Claim and the clawback exposure of the Defendant Fiduciaries.

Query, should Judge Rakoff be inquiring into these Schedule 1 Foundation matters as part of his review and approval of the Settlement Agreement?  Should the Schedule 1 Foundations properly be dropped from Schedule 1 of the Settlement Agreement altogether in order to resolve the potential issues? If the Schedule 1 Foundations were to be excluded from involvement in the Settlement Agreement, should the Defendant Fiduciaries be expected to provide substitute funding sources? Whether these questions will be addressed remains to be seen.

(Michael J. Kline, the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

[To be continued in Installment 76]

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Installments 66 and 65 in this blog series were earlier postings of aspects of the effects and aftermath, three years after disclosure, of Hadassah’s unfortunate decades-long involvement with Bernard Madoff (“Madoff”).

This posting will utilize recent publicly-available consolidated financial statements and Forms 990 of Hadassah, the Women’s Zionist Organization of America, Inc. and its related affiliated entities (collectively, “Hadassah”) to review the impact over the last several years of the Madoff scandal on the membership and dues and legal fees of Hadassah.

Membership and Dues

The following information on membership and dues is gleaned from the Hadassah Forms 990 for the respective indicated years:

The information above bears some further analysis. The short seven-month year ended 12/31/2008 resulted from a change in fiscal year by Hadassah to a calendar year. The disclosure of the Ponzi scheme of Madoff occurred December 11, 2008, so that almost all of the dues money had been received for 2008 by that time. Hadassah had a major increase in membership revenues in 2009 that perhaps was attributable, at least in part, to early sympathy that may have resulted from initial reports of millions of dollars in losses suffered by Hadassah in the Madoff scandal. Later in 2009 it surfaced that Hadassah had benefited in cashing out at least $77,000,000 in “fictitious profits” from Madoff.

Perhaps as a consequence of increased information about Hadassah’s involvement with Madoff made 2010 a relative disaster for Hadassah membership revenues as compared to the earlier years. It had such an impact that, as reported in at least one Hadassah publication in South Jersey to members in early 2012,

Hadassah had an amazing 2011 membership year with its “once in a lifetime” $100 deal for life memberships. Over 38,000 life memberships and associate enrollments were processed nationwide.

That membership drive may have yielded as much as $3,800,000 for 2011. However, it was clearly a one time event that was achieved by mortgaging potential future life and annual membership dues, as dues will no longer be generated from the 38,000 new life members. There may be an enduring positive benefit, however, of an increase in the total membership rolls and in volunteer enthusiasm through the 2011 life membership drive. The Hadassah web site quotes $212 as the cost of a life membership during 2012.

Finally, it is clear that Hadassah responded differently in the short fiscal year ended 12/31/2008 as compared to 2009 and 2010.

Legal fees

The following information on legal fees paid is reflected in the Hadassah Forms 990 for the respective indicated years:

Clearly, the costs of legal services for Hadassah were driven up substantially in 2009 and 2010 following the disclosure of the Madoff scandal. However, the legal fees had already started to subside in 2010, as Hadassah was moving toward its settlement with Picard that was completed in 2011.

In conclusion, the effects of the Madoff scandal on Hadassah and its mission have been materially adverse. It will take Hadassah some time for a complete recovery and reduce the effect to nothing more than a bad memory.

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

(To be continued in Installment 68)
 

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Installment 65 in this blog series was Part 1 of a review of the effects and aftermath, three years after disclosure, of Hadassah’s unfortunate decades-long involvement with Bernard Madoff (“Madoff”).

Several days after our posting of Part 1, ynetnews.com published a report from Calcalist (the “Calcalist Report”) about Hadassah Medical Organization (“HMO”), the Hadassah hospital in Israel that is supported and owned by Hadassah Medical Relief Association, Inc., which is the non-profit Hadassah affiliate that actually paid the $45,000,000 in cash settlement to Trustee Irving Picard in the Madoff bankruptcy, as reported in earlier Installments in this blog series. The Calcalist Report stated that

several of the [Hadassah] hospital's suppliers have been complaining that the center has yet to transfer payments worth tens and even hundreds of thousands of shekels, due weeks ago. Hadassah's debt to suppliers is said to amount to nearly NIS 10 million (about $2.65 million).

For its part, Hadassah was quoted by Calcalist as responding as follows:

[U]nlike other hospitals, Hadassah does not receive any budgeting from the government or the State health system. This is a temporary setback in a minor portion of the payments due to the fact that Hadassah has not received all of its due payments from various parties.

Those familiar with hospital finances in the United States and the delays in revenues from third party payers that can often exist, thereby causing adverse cash flow effects and the necessity to delay vendor payments, can appreciate the unfortunate plight of HMO. Nonetheless, the fact that HMO’s delay in payments is deemed newsworthy underscores the adversity that continues to beleaguer the Hadassah organization in the aftermath of Madoff. The Calcalist Report cannot serve to generate confidence among HMO patients, professionals, support staff, donors and vendors that Hadassah has successfully put the effects of the Madoff scandal to rest.
 

(Installment 67 will provide Part 3 of this Hadassah report.)

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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Numerous Installments, including Installments 48 and 42, in this blog series about the Ponzi scheme of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) have discussed Hadassah, its unfortunate decades-long involvement with Madoff and the aftermath. The matters covered include Hadassah’s original potential “clawback” exposure of up to $77,000,000 or more; the payment in early 2011 by Hadassah of $45,000,000 (the “Payment”) in a final settlement (the “Settlement”) with Irving H. Picard, the Trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy, who thereby permitted Hadassah to keep $32,000,000 in “fictitious profits” from the Ponzi scheme; the limited public transparency by Hadassah of developments in the Madoff scandal, especially in its filings of Forms 990 with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and other matters.

With the recent passage of the third anniversary of the arrest of Bernard Madoff, it appears appropriate to review where Hadassah currently stands in light of the Settlement and the Payment, as reflected in publicly available documents. Last week we obtained from Hadassah copies of its Forms 990 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010 (the “2010 Forms 990”) that were recently filed with the IRS, as they are not yet available on GuideStar. Along with the 2010 Forms 990, we obtained from Hadassah its consolidated financial statements for 2010 as audited by KPMG (the “2010 Financial Statements”). Hadassah should be commended for its commitment to make available its annual audited consolidated financial statements upon request, as there is no legal obligation for it to do so.

The Settlement and Payment by Hadassah to Trustee Picard is reflected in the financial statements for 2010 in both the 2010 Forms 990 and the 2010 Financial Statements. The actual disbursement of the Payment was made by Hadassah Medical Relief Association, Inc., one of the affiliated Hadassah entities (“HMRA”) included in the 2010 Financial Statements, and did not occur until the first quarter of 2011. Nevertheless, in line with Hadassah’s history of minimal public reporting on the Madoff matter, which, to say the least, constituted a major watershed event in recent Hadassah history, Hadassah’s discussion of the Settlement and the Payment in the 2010 Financial Statements is terse and is even less descriptive in the 2010 Forms 990 filed with the IRS.

The following is “Footnote (14) - Subsequent Event” to the 2010 Financial Statements that describes the Settlement and the Payment:

In December 2008, Hadassah learned that it had been a victim of the fraudulent scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff Securities LLC (Madoff). Madoff has been placed in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee (the Trustee) has informed creditors that substantially all amounts recorded in accounts with Madoff, like those of Hadassah’s, were worthless. The Trustee’s responsibilities include the recovery of Madoff’s assets from any available sources. Under certain circumstances, the Trustee may be able to recover amounts from account holders who, like Hadassah, received direct or indirect distributions from Madoff within the six-year period prior to the date of the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Hadassah has communicated with representatives of the Trustee concerning its accounts with Madoff. On February 16, 2011, Hadassah and the Trustee reached a final nonappealable settlement in the amount of $45,000,000, which is included in accounts payable and accrued expenses in the accompanying consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 2010. The settlement payment was made to the Trustee in March 2011.

In contrast, the following is the disclosure of the Settlement and Payment in the 2010 Form 990 of HMRA (“Form 990 Disclosure”):

SETTLEMENT PAYMENT
FORM 990, PART IX, LINE 24A
PART IX, LINE 24 A "SETTLEMENT PAYMENT" IN THE AMOUNT OF $45,000,000 WAS A PAYMENT MADE TO TRUSTEE OF THE MADOFF BANKRUPTCY ESTATE TO SETTLE ALLEGED CLAIMS OF THE ESTATE AGAINST HADASSAH PURSUANT TO A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

The Form 990 Disclosure does not give context or background to the $45,000,000 Payment as did Footnote (14) to the 2010 Financial Statements. The abbreviated Form 990 Disclosure does not seem to do justice to a sum which dwarfs the figures in the 2010 Financial Statements reflected for total 2010 Hadassah consolidated (i) program services expenses of $29,051,633 and (ii) fund-raising and management and general expenses of $25,956,921. The total shown in the 2010 Financial Statements for all Hadassah consolidated expenses for 2010, which excludes the Payment, was $55,008,554, only 22% higher than the Payment.

As discussed in Installment 42 of this series, the December 2008 Forms 990 of Hadassah (the “2008 Forms 990”), which reported a short-year seven-month period ended December 31, 2008 because of a fiscal year change to the calendar year, contained a detailed statement of the Madoff matter. The statement was similar to that contained in the 2008 audited consolidated financial statements. Ironically, however, the 2008 Forms 990 have never been posted on GuideStar to this point, although I have brought the fact to GuideStar’s attention in the past. While Hadassah is not responsible for the omission by GuideStar, the result is that none of the Forms 990 of Hadassah posted to date on GuideStar has any reference to the Madoff matter.

(Installment 66 will provide Part 2 of this Hadassah pulse report.)
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the fifty-third in a series of Installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the global Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Installments 51 and 52  and earlier Installments of this series have discussed the apparently inconsistent and peremptory approach that Irving Picard, the Trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy (“Picard”) has taken with respect to the Wilpon/Katz families, the owners of the New York Mets, and their Section 501(c)(3) private foundations (collectively, the “Wilpon/Katz Families”), in contrast to the Lautenberg Foundation, a Section 501(c)(3) private foundation (“Lautenberg”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg.

As early as Installment 17 this series raised the question as to whether the Wilpons would be treated differently from Hadassah and other charities by Picard. There has been continuing publicity regarding the spectacle of the Wilpon/Katz Families v. Picard.

In Installment 52, this series observed the following:

Thus it would appear that Picard has made peremptory and perplexing decisions not only as to the Madoff investors that he has chosen to pursue but also the extent of recoveries that he is seeking. While the Wilpon/Katz families, including the Wilpon/Katz Foundations, will spend millions of dollars in legal fees and most likely hundreds of millions in settlement or satisfaction of judgments, other Madoff investors like Hadassah and the Lautenberg Foundation will keep millions in fictitious profits or even recover payments in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding.

Recently, I had the privilege and pleasure of hearing Jeffrey Toobin, a senior analyst for CNN Worldwide since 2003 and a staff writer at The New Yorker since 1993, who is one of the country’s most esteemed experts and authors on politics, media and the law, especially the U.S. Supreme Court. His book “The Nine: Inside the Secret World of the Supreme Court (2007),” was highly acclaimed. Mr. Toobin’s forthcoming book, “The Oath: The Secret Struggle for the Supreme Court,” will be published in 2012. He was the featured speaker on the subject of the U.S. Supreme Court at a luncheon during the partners’ retreat of my law firm earlier this month. Because I knew of Mr. Toobin’s interest and fan support of the New York Mets, I asked him a question about Picard and the Wilpon/Katz Families.

I inquired whether he thought that the aggressive and somewhat incongruous approach taken by Picard against the Wilpon/Katz Families in seeking not only fictitious profits but also principal was part of a larger strategy of Picard to use a success in recovering more than fictitious profits from these highly visible and vulnerable victims as a segue and steppingstone to his attacks on JPMorgan Chase, HSBC and other institutions.

Mr. Toobin responded that he believed that Picard is treating the Wilpon/Katz Families quite unfairly and manifestly different from other individual investors with Madoff. He added that it is possible that Picard is using the case of the Wilpon/Katz Families to set a precedent of a recovery in excess of fictitious profits to use in cases of banks that have much more financial ability to oppose Picard for an extended period of time. Mr. Toobin added that, based on published information, it appeared that the banks should have known that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme.

I extend my thanks to Mr. Toobin for his response.

[To be continued in Installment 54]
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the fifty-second in a series of installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the global Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Installment 51 of this series presented a tabular comparison of financial information derived from the 2007, 2008 and 2009 Forms 990-PF filed with the Internal Revenue Service by (i) The Lautenberg Foundation, a Section 501(c)(3) private foundation (“Lautenberg”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and (ii) the Section 501(c)(3) private foundations formed by the owners of the New York Mets: the Judy & Fred Wilpon Family Foundation, Inc., and the Iris & Saul Katz Family Foundation, Inc. (collectively, the “Wilpon/Katz Foundations”). (The Lautenberg Foundation and the Wilpon/Katz Foundations are sometimes collectively referred to herein as the “Foundations.”)

The table in Installment 51 shows that the Lautenberg Foundation and the Wilpon/Katz Foundations suffered crushing losses in fair market value of assets from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009. During that two year period each of the Foundations lost at least 80% of its fair market value of assets as a result of write-offs attributable to the revelations regarding Madoff. In addition, each of the Foundations saw disastrous losses or declines in investment income during 2008 and 2009 from the level achieved in 2007 as a result of the losses recognized from investments with Madoff.

The Form 990-PF filed by each of the Foundations for 2007 (the last full fiscal year for the Foundations before the Madoff scandal erupted in December 2008) indicated that an appreciable portion of income and contributions reflected for that year were attributable to the fictitious profits from investments with Madoff and distributions from such “profits” to the Foundation. The largest amount of Madoff "profits" so reflected for 2007 was $947,565 that was reported by the Lautenberg Foundation.

While Picard continues his relentless pursuit of the Wilpon/Katz families, including the Wilpon/Katz Foundations for not only “clawback” of $300 million of fictitious profits but also return of principal of $700 million, there is no such pursuit of the Lautenberg Foundation, even for clawback. Moreover, there is even evidence (while not conclusive because of a lack of an explanatory note) in the 2009 Form 990-PF filed by the Lautenberg Foundation that it received a cash recovery of $500,000 in the Madoff proceeding. See Installment 50 of this series for further discussion.

Thus it would appear that Picard has made peremptory and perplexing decisions not only as to the Madoff investors that he has chosen to pursue but also the extent of recoveries that he is seeking. While the Wilpon/Katz families, including the Wilpon/Katz Foundations, will spend millions of dollars in legal fees and most likely hundreds of millions in settlement or satisfaction of judgments, other Madoff investors like Hadassah and the Lautenberg Foundation will keep millions in fictitious profits or even recover payments in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding.

[To be continued in Installment 53]
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the fifty-first in a series of installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”).  Installments 49 and Installment 50 of this series and several prior Installments have discussed The Lautenberg Foundation, a private foundation (“Lautenberg”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and its investment with Madoff.  

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Earlier this month, I had the privilege of participating as a panelist the ABA Business Law Section’s spring meeting concerning the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions. Those statutory provisions, together with follow-on regulations, are intended to better equip the Securities and Exchange Commission to perform its enforcement function by incentivizing corporate insiders to provide information about corporate wrongdoing, such as insider trading, reporting violations, or Foreign Corrupt Practice Act violations.

The new SEC whistleblowing regime borrows from existing, and successful, protocols long-established by the Internal Revenue Code and the False Claims Act. The IRS rewards tipsters with a percentage of eventual tax recoveries, while typically allowing the sources of the information to remain anonymous. See 26 U.S.C. § 7623. The FCA in contrast requires the filing of a qui tam complaint which is sealed for a period of time while the Department of Justice evaluates the matter and determines whether or not to take over the civil, treble-damages litigation and, commonly, to initiate a criminal investigation of the underlying misconduct; successful civil lawsuits yield percentage recoveries for the initial qui tam complainant. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. The SEC model does not involve the filing of a complaint, even under seal, but the submission of a claim form, and the anonymity of the informant is not assured. An excellent discussion of these different, but related, approaches is found in co-panelist Michael E. Clark’s The Dodd-Frank Act’s Bounty Hunter Provisions, 44 Rev. of Sec. Comm. Reg., No. 3, Feb. 9, 2011.

As part of a tactical modernization, the SEC last year finally adopted a formal cooperation policy, allowing the Enforcement Division to assure cooperating individuals that they would not be sued, or limiting their exposure to suit, all tied to the nature and quality of their cooperation. The adoption of both a whistleblowing reward system and a formalized methodology for recognizing and developing cooperation may seem to be radical changes for the SEC, but attorneys with experience in white-collar defense are intimately familiar with both models, since they have for years been staples of the Department of Justice.

The adoption by the SEC of these new/old weapons raises a number of interesting questions, including: (i) do internal corporate governance mechanisms need to be modified to capture reports of wrongdoing before the reporters go to the SEC and to incentivize officers and employees to first exhaust their internal reporting approaches; (ii) are these SEC regulations broadly destructive of internal corporate cultures and concepts of attorney-client privilege and fiduciary duties owed to the company and shareholders; and (iii) does the new whistleblowing culture make it even more imperative that in-house counsel act quickly to enlist outside counsel, with experience in these new/old issues, and that outside counsel move more quickly to conduct investigations of activities which are feared to be the subject of a whistleblower report?

These and other Dodd-Frank whistleblower issues will be developed through further entries on this blog.

(Alain Leibman, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office. A former decorated federal prosecutor, he practices both criminal defense and commercial litigation in federal and state courts)
 

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This is the fiftieth in a series of installments on this blog that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Installment 49,  Installment 41 and several prior Installments in this series have discussed The Lautenberg Foundation, a private charitable foundation (the “Foundation”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and its investment with Madoff. The 2008 Form 990-PF (the “2008 Form 990-PF”) and the 2009 Form 990-PF (the “2009 Form 990-PF” and, collectively with the 2008 Form 990-PF, the “Foundation Forms 990-PF”) filed by the Foundation with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) are the vehicles for the analysis on this blog of the financial impact on the Foundation of its relationship with Madoff . The Foundation Forms 990-PF are available to the public on the charity information Web site GuideStar.

Comparing the 2009 Form 990-PF to the 2008 Form 990-PF, which was filed with the IRS 15 days earlier, reveals some interesting new financial information, as follows:

The 2009 Form 990-PF reflects a fair market value of assets for the Foundation as of
December 31, 2009, of $967,302, almost the same amount as the fair market value of assets for the Foundation as of December 31, 2008 of $1,001,517. Yet the Foundation reported an excess of expenses over revenues of ($365,087) (the “Loss”) for 2009. The major source of the Loss was explained in Statement 3 to the 2009 Form 990-PF as a charge for “Madoff Theft Loss Balance Remaining” of ($296,072) to “Revenue per Books” and “Net Investment Income.”

Statement 6 to the 2009 Form 990-PF reflected Corporate Stock holdings of the Foundation in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC with zero book and market values as of December 31, 2009. As observed in Installment 41 of this series, Statement 9 to the 2008 Form 990-PF, which was filed with the IRS 15 days earlier than the 2009 Form 990-PF, reflected Corporate Stock holdings of the Foundation in Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC with a book value of $696,072 and a fair market value of $400,000 as of December 31, 2008. No statement was given in either of the Foundation Forms 990-PF as to the basis for the valuations.

No contributions, gifts, grants, etc. were reported in the 2009 Form 990-PF by the Foundation as having been received during 2009, and the only positive income was interest and dividends aggregating $13,909.

Notwithstanding the foregoing items, the 2009 Form 990-PF discloses a new asset on line 2 of its Balance Sheet of $500,239 in “Savings and temporary cash investments.” Statement 2 to the 2009 Form 990-PF reflects $239 in “Interest on Savings and Temporary Cash Investments” from Bank of America. Nowhere, however, in the 2009 Form 990-PF is there any explanation or statement about the $500,000 cash item on the Balance Sheet.

Installment 41 raised the following question: In light of the filing of the 2008 Form 990-PF in November 2010, almost two years after the Madoff arrest, with a wealth of information available about the Madoff bankruptcy/liquidation proceeding (the “Madoff Proceeding”), was the $400,000 in fair market value reflective of an anticipated amount recoverable or already recovered in the Madoff Proceeding by the Foundation?

One can reasonably speculate that $500,000 of the cash reflected on line 2 of the Balance Sheet in the 2009 Form 990-PF may be a distribution to the Foundation in the Madoff Proceeding of the $500,000 maximum amount payable to a securities customer by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

In contrast to a potential payment to the Foundation in the Madoff Proceeding, Installment 41 observed that the 2008 Form 990-PF reflected charitable contributions aggregating $330,445 during 2008. It is unclear whether such contributions were made in whole or in part from cash distributions received by the Foundation from Madoff during 2008 before his arrest in December 2008. Installment 41 asked whether any or all of such amounts could be subject to “clawback” by Irving Picard, the Trustee in the Madoff Proceeding (the “Trustee”). (Similar questions could be raised about the charitable contributions reported in the Foundation’s Forms 990-PF for 2005, 2006 and 2007 in light of the fact that, in each of those years, 70% or more of the investment income and fair market value of assets were reported by the Foundation as attributable to Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC.)

Finally, a principal theme of this series on Madoff is that Irving Picard has been treating charitable organizations inconsistently in the Madoff Proceeding. Installment 48, for example, highlighted the difference in treatment by the Trustee of Hadassah and the Wilpon/Katz private charitable foundations. It would have been helpful to this analysis if an explanation had been provided by the Foundation for the $500,000 cash item that appeared on its Balance Sheet as of December 31, 2009 without a corresponding item in the Analysis of Revenue and Expenses in Part I of the 2009 Form 990-PF.
 

[To be continued in Installment 51]

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the forty-ninth in a series of installments on this blog  that are discussing issues arising in the aftermath of the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Many of the Installments in this series have focused on specific problems and concerns respecting public charities and private foundations that were victims of this and similar schemes.

Installment 40 and Installment 41, among others, of this series have discussed the fact that The Lautenberg Foundation, a private charitable foundation (the “Foundation”), which was formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg and had invested with Madoff, was one year past due in filing its 2008 Form 990-PF (the “2008 Form 990-PF”) with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”).

Apparently the 2009 Form 990-PF (the “2009 Form 990-PF” and, collectively with the 2008 Form 990-PF, the “Foundation Forms 990-PF”) was also filed past due with the IRS, albeit 15 days after the final IRS due date of November 15, 2010 (after all available extensions). Both the 2008 Form 990-PF and the 2009 Form 990-PF are now available to the public on the charity information Web site GuideStar.

The availability of the 2009 Form 990-PF on GuideStar was surprising to me. As reported in the earlier Installments, I had been requesting by email from the Lautenberg Foundation a copy of the 2009 Form 990-PF virtually every time that I had requested the 2008 Form 990-PF, including a November 16, 2010 email thanking the Foundation for supplying me with the 2008 Form 990-PF. This thank-you email request of November 16, 2010 preceded the filing by the Foundation of its 2009 Form 990-PF by 14 days.

General Instruction Q entitled “Public Inspection Requirements” of the IRS instructions for completion of Form 990-PF (the “IRS Instructions”) requires a private foundation to mail a Form 990-PF within 30 days to a person who makes a request for such Form by electronic mail. General Instruction Q also refers to IRS Rules that provide for potential penalties for failure of a foundation to file timely or to comply with the public inspection rules. Obviously, since I never received the Foundation’s 2009 Form 990-PF in response to my numerous email requests, the Foundation did not comply in my case with the 30-day response requirement of General Instruction Q. Yet, perplexingly, in both the 2008 Form 990-PF and the 2009 Form 990-PF filed in November 2010, the Foundation answered “Yes” to the following question on line 13 in Part VII-A: “Did the foundation comply with the public inspection requirements for its annual returns and exemption application?”

It is my belief that in one or both years the Foundation’s answer should have been “No” for failure to deliver the Foundation Forms 990-PF on a timely basis in response to my requests.

In a related matter, Installment 41 discussed Statement 8 to the 2008 Form 990-PF provided to me by the accountant for the Foundation. Statement 8 stated the following as to the reason for the late filing and the potential for penalties for late filings:

This return is being filed late due to the uncertainty caused by the majority of the Foundations [sic] assets being loss [sic] to Bernard L. Maddoff [sic] in December 2008. We respectfully request that all late filing penalties be abated.

While the 2008 Form 990-PF supplied to me contained Statement 8 on page 16, for whatever reason, Statement 8 and page 16 of the 2008 Form 990-PF available to the public on GuideStar are missing, with page 17 immediately following page 15.

For the above reasons, the Foundation should consider filing amendments to the Foundation Forms 990-PF in order that the apparent deficiencies can be remedied. This blog series will provide a Part 2 that will discuss further the Foundation Forms 990-PF.
 

[To be continued in Installment 50]

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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Several Installments in this blog series about the long-running, global Ponzi scheme of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”), the most recent of which was Installment 45,  have discussed certain aspects of the scheme’s impact on the Wilpon Family, who are best known as the owners of the New York Mets. The Installments revolved primarily around potential “clawback” exposure from investments with Madoff of Judy & Fred Wilpon Family Foundation, Inc., a charitable Section 501(c)(3) private foundation (the “Wilpon Foundation”).

Installment 45 discussed the vigorous pursuit of the Wilpon Family by Irving Picard, the Bankruptcy Trustee for the Madoff Estate (“Picard”), in contrast to his proposed settlement with Hadassah (the “Hadassah Settlement”). On February 17, 2011, Picard moved for approval by the bankruptcy court of the Hadassah Settlement, under which Hadassah would pay $45,000,000 of its alleged $77,000,000 clawback exposure for the final six years of the reported 20 years that Hadassah invested with Madoff.

The Forms 990-PF filed with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) by the Wilpon Foundation in recent years provide helpful information on its distributions from the Madoff scheme and may be accessed on GuideStar. The Forms 990-PF filed with the IRS by Iris & Saul Katz Family Foundation, Inc. (the “Katz Foundation”), a charitable Section 501(c)(3) private foundation formed by members of the Katz Family, are also accessible on GuideStar.

Installment 45 of this series also discussed the Complaint filed by Picard against dozens of Defendants comprised of members of the Wilpon and Katz Families, their business associates and business investments, including the New York Mets, numerous real estate ventures and others (collectively, the “Defendants”). The Complaint revealed Picard’s determination to seek not only alleged “Fictitious Profits” relating to clawback but also additional hundreds of millions in principal transfers from Madoff to named Defendants. Two of the Defendants named in the Complaint are the Wilpon Foundation and the Katz Foundation (collectively, the “Foundations”).

The Complaint alleges on pages 264-265 that the Wilpon Foundation received not only $2,230,588 in Fictitious Profits from Madoff, but also “other direct transfers . . . of principal in an amount subject to discovery and proof at trial [‘Principal Transfers’].” The Katz Foundation numbers alleged in the Complaint are even higher. Pages 262-264 of the Complaint alleges that the Katz Foundation received $3,272,382 in Fictitious Profits from Madoff and other direct Principal Transfers. In addition, the Complaint seeks from the Katz Foundation alleged indirect Fictitious Profits and Principal Transfers as a subsequent transferee.

A review of the 2008 Forms 990-PF filed with the IRS by the Wilpon Foundation (the “Wilpon Form 990-PF”) and the Katz Foundation (the “Katz Form 990-PF” and, collectively with the Wilpon Form 990-PF, the “Forms 990-PF”) sheds some light on at least a portion of the Principal Transfers that Picard is seeking from the Foundations.

Each of the Foundations filed as Appendix A to its Form 990-PF an IRS “Statement by Taxpayer Using the Procedures in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 to Determine a Theft Loss Deduction Related to a Fraudulent Investment Arrangement.” It applies to information only as to tax years of the Foundations that were still open to tax audit.

Appendix A to the Wilpon Form 990-PF revealed for open tax years an initial investment of $114,227 with Madoff, subsequent additional investments of $1,963,189 and income reported in prior years of $1,312,617, for a total of $3,390,033. More significantly, the Wilpon Foundation Appendix A reports withdrawals of $3,296,500. The withdrawal figure of $3,296,500 presumably is the least that Picard would be seeking from the Wilpon Foundation in Fictitious Profits and Principal Transfers for the years covered by Appendix A to the Wilpon Form 990-PF.

Appendix A to the Katz Form 990-PF disclosed for open tax years an initial investment of $1,335,000 with Madoff, subsequent additional investments of $1,376,702 and income reported in prior years of $1,030,854, for a total of $3,742,556. More significantly, the Katz Foundation Appendix A reflected withdrawals of $3,742,122. The withdrawal figure of $3,742,566 would be presumably be the least that Picard is seeking from the Katz Foundation in Fictitious Profits and Principal Transfers for the years covered by Appendix A to the Katz Form 990-PF.

It would appear that Picard is seeking $7 million or more from the Foundations, which have given away millions of dollars each year to worthy charities according to their Forms 990-PF. The Wilpon Foundation reported charitable contributions, gifts and grants paid totaling $6,318,421 in the three years ended December 31, 2010, while the Katz Foundation reported charitable contributions, gifts and grants paid totaling $4,038,879 in the same period. Nevertheless, Picard is willing to settle for approximately 58% of the Fictitious Profits reported for Hadassah, presumably because they may be a worthier charitable vehicle in his eyes than the Foundations. This developing scenario warrants further monitoring.

[To be continued in Installment 47]
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)

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Several Installments in this blog series about the long-running, global Ponzi scheme of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) have discussed certain aspects of the scheme’s impact on the Wilpon Family, who are best known as the owners of the New York Mets. Installment 27 was the most recent to discuss the involvement of the Wilpon Family with Madoff. These Installments revolved around potential “clawback” exposure and the investments of the Judy and Fred Wilpon Family Foundation with Madoff.

Similarly, numerous other Installments, the most recent of which was Installment 44, 
have discussed Hadassah and its unfortunate involvements with Madoff. The matters covered include Hadassah’s potential “clawback” exposure, the questionable approach that Hadassah has used to disclose its investments with Madoff in Forms 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service, its proposed settlement with the Madoff Trustee and other matters.

Installment 17 of this series, published on October 26, 2009, was entitled “The Madoff Profit Game: Will the Mets End up Losers Off the Field While Charity Stakeholders Become Winners?” In Installment 17, Diana B. Henriques was quoted as having written on May 28, 2009 in The New York Times, “There is the widespread fear among some — unfounded, [Irving] Picard [the trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding] says — that he will sue struggling charities or people of limited means for money they withdrew in the past but no longer have.”

I stated the following in Installment 17:

Will Picard choose to pursue the Mets and the Wilpon family while passing on Hadassah? All charities, especially those providing social services like Hadassah, are “struggling” with materially reduced contributions because of the economy, increased demands by individuals who are unemployed and suffering financially, losses in endowment funds from the substantial market declines and increased regulatory activity.

While the position earlier stated by Picard as to charities may be humanitarian and emotionally appealing, there is little basis in the law for the disparity in treatment between charities and for-profit entities. This inequality of approach will more likely than not lead to protracted litigation and uncertainty in the Madoff matter.

Picard has now fulfilled my concerns beyond my expectations. Both the Wilpons and Hadassah have made news recently relating to how Picard is dealing with their status as “winners” under his formula for determining “Fictitious Profits” from Madoff that were subject to clawback. Most recently, on February 4, 2011, the Madoff bankruptcy court unsealed a 796-page Complaint, including Exhibits, against dozens of Defendants comprised of members of the Wilpon Family, their business associates and their respective families, business investments including the New York Mets, numerous real estate ventures and others (collectively, the “Wilpons” or the “Defendants”).

The Complaint revealed Picard’s determination to seek recovery from the Wilpons of not only $300,000,000 of identified transfers of Fictitious Profits but also additional hundreds of millions in principal transfers from the named Defendants. The Complaint describes the alleged existence of many “red flags” from which the Defendants knew or should have known over decades that Madoff was operating a Ponzi scheme as the basis for recovery beyond Fictitious Profits.

Contrast this dramatic Complaint of Picard with the disclosure in early December 2010 from Nancy Falchuk, National President of Hadassah in a letter respecting the Madoff scandal. The letter stated that Hadassah was voluntarily paying $45,000,000 to settle, subject to approval of the bankruptcy court, a potential clawback claim for Fictitious Profits by Picard of as much as $97,000,000. Installment 42 of this series reported on the Falchuk letter and the fact that Hadassah had been investing with Madoff for a period of 20 years. Moreover, Hadassah had sophisticated investment advisers over the period of their Madoff investments.

It is difficult to rationalize the stark disparity in approach to these cases by Picard, other than the fact that Hadassah is a charity. In the case of the Wilpons, Picard is seeking hundreds of millions of dollars beyond the alleged Fictitious Profits. In the case of Hadassah he has agreed to let Hadassah retain $55,000,000 of Fictitious Profits at the expense of other Madoff victims. Both the Wilpons and Hadassah had been investing with Madoff for decades. This perplexing matter warrants further monitoring.

[To be continued in Installment 46]
 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)

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Several Installments in this series about the long-running, global Ponzi scheme of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”), the most recent of which was Installment 42, have discussed Hadassah and its unfortunate involvements with Madoff. The matters covered include Hadassah’s potential “clawback” exposure, the questionable approach that Hadassah has used to disclose its investments with Madoff in Forms 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”), its proposed settlement with the Madoff Trustee and other matters.

On December 21, 2010, my spouse, who has been a life member of Hadassah for decades, received in the mail (the “Mailing”) from Nancy Falchuk, National President of Hadassah, the letter respecting the Madoff scandal that Installment 42 reported Hadassah had posted on its website (the “Posting”). The Mailing and the Posting (collectively, the “Falchuk Letter”) reported the $45 million Hadassah settlement in the Madoff matter (the “Settlement”).

The Mailing is identical to the Posting with one notable exception. In the Mailing the second sentence of the following paragraph is in bold type while it is not in bold type in the Posting:
“Hadassah’s fiscal discipline will allow it to pay this obligation from existing unrestricted funds. As always, Hadassah gifts will continue to be used for their intended purpose.”

The paragraph, and especially the bold sentence, suggest that the payment of the Settlement will be made from funds other than gifts to Hadassah. In my view, the suggestion is specious, almost to the point of being disingenuous. Hadassah’s “existing unrestricted funds” are the aggregation of gifts over many years from the generosity of past donors to the mission of Hadassah, together with the income earned on such gifts.

In addition, the Falchuk Letter does not shed light on the entire Settlement picture, as the costs of achieving the Settlement go far beyond the actual payment of the $45 million dollars to be made to the Madoff bankruptcy estate. Statement 4 of the Hadassah Form 990 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 (the “2009 Form 990”), which has not yet been posted on GuideStar, reports the compensation of the five highest paid independent contractors that received $100,000. The 2009 Form 990 reveals that during 2009 Hadassah spent an aggregate of $2,753,922 on legal, accounting and consulting fees.

In contrast, Statement 4 of the Form 990 filed by Hadassah for its newly-designated fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 (the “December 2008 Form 990”), revealed a total of $497,280 for legal and accounting fees for the seven month short period that was covered. (The Madoff scandal did not come to light until December 11, 2008.) The December 2008 Form 990 was the first year that the Form 990 required reporting of compensation for professional services of the type reported on Statement 4.

Even if the amount for professionals reported in the December 2008 Form 990 is doubled to $1 million to take into account a full year, the huge increase in 2009 in professional costs for Hadassah must be largely attributable to the legal, accounting, governance and public relations issues flowing from the Madoff matter.

One can only speculate as to the amount of professional fees that are likely to be reported by Hadassah for 2010, as the Falchuk Letter points out that the Settlement of the “clawback” issue involved “many months of negotiation.” This would certainly translate into substantial professional fees, again perhaps running into the millions of dollars. The professional fees, like the Settlement itself, will have to be paid, presumably from “existing unrestricted funds.” Hadassah should be forthcoming in revealing such costs of the Settlement to its donors.

Nonetheless, the professionals will have certainly earned their fees if, as noted in the Falchuk Letter, the required bankruptcy court approval is obtained by Hadassah. However, even that remains to be seen. For example, Thom Weidlich reported on January 6, 2011, in businessweek.com that a group of Madoff victims has already objected in the bankruptcy court to a settlement in which the estate of Jeffry Picower agreed to return $7.2 billion he allegedly made in the Madoff scandal. An objection to the Settlement could be filed in the Hadassah case as well.

Many, like my wife, who support or belong to this venerable charitable organization should be acutely disappointed that Hadassah has not been more accurate and forthright with its donors in its public statements and IRS filings. As stated in earlier Installments, I believe that Hadassah would be far better served to make prompt, visible, clear and consistent disclosures to regain the confidence of its loyal supporters who faithfully fund its historic mission.

[To be continued in Installment 45]

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders.  Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

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This is the forty-third in a series of Installments on this blog that discuss issues that arose in the aftermath of the Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) scandal, especially for the charities that invested with him. In particular, Installment 33 and Installment 31 of this series provided analysis of American Jewish Congress, Inc. (“AJCongress”) and the consequences of its reported huge losses from investing with Madoff.

Installment 31 stated that, on July 22, 2010, AJCongress President Richard S. Gordon (“Mr. Gordon”) reported on the AJCongress Website that the organization was suspending operations after, among other things, “Bernie Madoff stole approximately $21 million from our organization. . . .” [Emphasis supplied]

An article on December 13, 2010 by Jacob Berkman in “The Fundermentalist” quotes Mr. Gordon as having said the following, in response to an earlier media report that AJCongress was subject to “clawback” by Irving Picard, Trustee for the Madoff bankruptcy (“Mr. Picard”):

There is no talk of a clawback from us with the trustee . . . . Madoff stole approximately $23 million from us. There has been no discussion about [the American Jewish Congress] paying back money. . . . Hadassah signed for a completely different reason. . . . I can in all honestly [sic] say [a clawback] never seriously crossed my mind once.... We are operating and working on a number of different projects. Obviously we are in a period of evaluating how to move forward.... the nature of how we go forward has not been determined yet.

Perplexingly, however, on December 9, 2010, four days earlier, AJCongress, like Hadassah (as reported in Installment 42 of this series) entered into a stipulation with Mr. Picard in the Madoff bankruptcy case (the “Stipulation”) to toll the statute of limitations on potential claims against AJCongress (Case Number: 08-01789-brl Document Number: 3328 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York). Presumably, Mr. Picard deemed the Stipulation to be necessary to reserve potential rights to file suit against AJCongress in the future.

While AJCongress does not appear to be continuing its mission as usual, it is certainly continuing business on its website in soliciting memberships and donations. As reported in Installment 33, on August 5, 2010, I became an individual member in AJCongress online with a credit card payment. On December 15, 2010, I made a donation online with a credit card payment.  An unknowing visitor to the AJCongress website could easily become a member or make a donation without any alert on those solicitation pages as to the current limbo status of the AJCongress mission.

The only obvious change in disclosure since July 22, 2010 on the AJCongress website was the deletion of its 2009 Annual Report, which, as reported in Installment 31, conflicted in its narrative with other statements of Mr. Gordon as to the current state of AJCongress affairs.

The AJCongress website ends its “About Us” page with the words: “We are an effective voice defending Jewish interests and advancing Jewish hopes, values, and aspirations.” In my view, its voice would be more effective and credible if the disclosure deficiencies on the AJCongress website were addressed and rectified promptly.

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

[To be continued in Installment 44]
 

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Several Installments in this blog series about the long-running, global Ponzi scheme of Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) have discussed Hadassah and its unfortunate involvements with Madoff. The matters covered include Hadassah’s potential “clawback” exposure, the questionable approach that Hadassah has used to disclose its investments with Madoff in Forms 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) and other matters.

Now, on the eve of the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations for Trustee Irving Picard to bring a lawsuit for clawback against Hadassah, in the midst of the holiday season for multiple faiths and the rush to generate end-of-year donations, Nancy Falchuk, President of Hadassah, published a letter on the Hadassah website in which she reported the following:

Hadassah was introduced to Bernard Madoff Securities in 1988 by a French donor, through a $7M gift. In addition to the gift, between 1988 and 1996, we deposited $33M in our accounts, and by April 2007 had withdrawn $137M. . . .

Like so many, for those who withdrew more than they had invested, we faced a “clawback.” After many months of negotiation, and as a direct result of good faith cooperation of Irving Picard, the Madoff Trustee, and his counsel, we arrived at an agreement, allowing us to continue our commitment to Israel. According to that agreement, subject to approval of the bankruptcy court, Hadassah will pay back $45M (emphasis added).

Therefore, Hadassah is voluntarily paying $45 million to settle a potential clawback claim by Mr. Picard of as much as $97 million. This follows two years of perplexing and conflicting public statements and filings by Hadassah. Originally, as reported in Installment 14 of this series, Hadassah reported publicly a loss from Madoff investments of $90 million. In contrast, more recently Installment 32 stated the following:

Installment 16, posted in September 2009, discussed the fact that it is alleged that Hadassah had received $40 million more in distributions from Madoff than it had invested with him. Additionally, an article by Diana B. Henriques in The New York Times was quoted in Installment 16 as having said, “[t]here is the widespread fear among some — unfounded, Mr. [Irving] Picard [the trustee in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding] says — that he will sue struggling charities or people of limited means for money they withdrew in the past but no longer have.”

Apparently the fear has been anything but unfounded in the case of Hadassah.

The continuous shifting of public information made available by Hadassah has been exacerbated by the mystifying disclosure or lack thereof in the Hadassah Form 990 filings with the IRS. Installment 14 of this series reported that the Form 990 of Hadassah posted on GuideStar for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2008 (the “May 2008 Form 990”) was filed with the IRS in April 2009. This filing was well after the Madoff scandal broke on December 11, 2008, and after publication of reports in the media that Hadassah had withdrawn $130 million from its Madoff account. While the May 2008 Form 990 had no reference to the Madoff scandal, Installment 23 of this series reported that

the [Hadassah] financial statements audited by KPMG for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2008 (and the [newly-changed] fiscal year ended December 31, 2008), disclosed in a lengthy footnote that Hadassah wrote off, as of May 31, 2008, $88,725,362 of carrying value of Madoff-related investments.

Installment 23 went on to observe that the Form 990 filed by Hadassah for its newly-designated fiscal year ended December 31, 2008 (the “December 2008 Form 990”) reported the following:
in a lengthy footnote (substantially similar to those in the financial statements audited by KPMG for the years ended May 31, 2008 and December 31, 2008) . . . Hadassah wrote off, as of May 31, 2008, $88,725,362 of carrying value of Madoff-related investments. . . . Hadassah management was unable to determine whether, or the extent to which, distributions to Hadassah from Madoff-related investments are recoverable by the trustee for Madoff.

(As an aside, for some unknown reason the December 2008 Form 990 has never been posted on GuideStar to this date, although I have brought the fact to GuideStar’s attention.)

I have this week obtained from Hadassah copies of its Form 990 for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009 (the “2009 Form 990”) that was recently filed with the IRS. Again, as was true of the 2008 Form 990, there is perplexingly no reference to the Madoff scandal or its potential impact on Hadassah.

Along with the 2009 Form 990, I obtained from Hadassah its audited consolidated financial statements for 2009 (the “2009 Financial Statements”). The date of the Independent Auditors’ Report of KPMG in the 2009 Financial Statements was November 29, 2010, just days before the letter from Ms. Falchuk was posted and a stipulation between Mr. Picard and Hadassah on December 9, 2010. entered in the Madoff bankruptcy case (the “Stipulation”) to toll the statute of limitations on potential clawback claims against Hadassah (Case Number: 08-01789-brl Document Number: 3327 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York). Presumably, the Stipulation was necessary to preserve Mr. Picard’s right to file suit against Hadassah should the settlement not become final.

In stark contrast to the 2009 Form 990, the second paragraph in Note 14 “Contingency” to the 2009 Financial Statements gives the following information as to the Madoff scandal:

Hadassah has begun settlement discussions with the Trustee [Mr. Picard] with respect to any claims that the bankruptcy estate believes it can assert against Hadassah for the recovery of any amounts previously received. The Trustee has not commenced litigation at this time. These discussions are in the early stage and the outcome is not reasonably estimable. If a settlement is reached in the present discussions, the amount of the settlement could be material to Hadassah. Hadassah intends to defend vigorously if no settlement is reached and the Trustee attempts to enforce the claims. If Hadassah is not successful in its defense of the claims, should they be made, the amounts recoverable by the Trustee could be material (emphasis added).

The limited disclosure in the 2009 Financial Statements is better than no disclosure at all in the 2009 Form 990, especially since the December 2008 Form 990 raised a question of uncertainty as to the effect of the Madoff scandal on Hadassah’s financial statements. I believe that, in light of the preliminary nature of the December 2008 Form 990 disclosure, Hadassah has a duty to make a full, fair and accurate clarification and update in the 2009 Form 990 and succeeding Form 990 filings. The lack of consistency between the 2009 Form 990 and the 2009 Financial Statements is also a concern.

Nonetheless, the limited disclosure in Note 14 to the 2009 Financial Statements is itself seriously deficient. The date of the auditors’ report of KPMG is November 29, 2010. In her letter, Ms. Falchuk wrote that the discussions that led to the $45 million settlement followed “many months of negotiation.” By November 29, 2010, the discussions were clearly no longer “in the early stage” and the outcome “not reasonably estimable” as stated in Note 14.

Many who support or even belong to this charitable organization must be acutely disappointed that Hadassah has not been more accurate and forthright with its donors in its public statements and IRS filings. During 2009 Hadassah received $32.3 million in contributions and bequests according to the 2009 Financial Statements. How would those donors have felt had they known that their contributions would in effect fund a $45 million settlement with Mr. Picard, and not promote the mission of Hadassah? How should 2010 donors feel about the settlement? I believe that Hadassah would be far better served to make visible, clear and consistent disclosures to regain the confidence of its loyal supporters who faithfully fund its historic mission.

[To be continued in Installment 43]

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)
 

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This is the forty-first in a series of installments on this blog that are discussing some of the issues arising in the aftermath of the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”). Many of the Installments in this series have focused on specific problems and concerns respecting public charities and private foundations that were victims of this and similar schemes.

Installment 40 of this series discussed the fact that The Lautenberg Foundation, a private charitable foundation (the “Foundation”) formed by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg was almost one year past due in filing its 2008 Form 990-PF (the “2008 Form 990-PF”) with the Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”). Apparently the 2008 Form 990-PF has now been filed with the IRS as of November 10, 2010, as the Foundation’s accountant provided a copy on the following day. The due date after, all available extensions, for the Foundation’s 2009 Form 990-PF (the “2009 Form 990-PF”) is November 15, 2010.

The 2008 Form 990-PF reveals some interesting information as follows:

The 2008 Form 990-PF reflects a fair market value of assets for the Foundation as of December 31, 2008, of $1,001,517, as compared to a fair market value of assets for the Foundation as of December 31, 2007 of $15,000,792, as reported in the Foundation’s 2007 Form 990-PF, a decline of $13,999,275, or 93.3%.

Statement 3 to the 2008 Form 990-PF states that the Foundation recognized a “Madoff Theft Loss 95%” of $13,225,367 in “Revenue per Books” and “Net Investment Income.”

Statement 8 to the 2008 Form 990-PF reflects the following as to the reason for the late filing and the potential for penalties for late filings as raised in Installment 40 of this series:

This return is being filed late due to the uncertainty caused by the majority of the Foundations [sic] assets being loss [sic] to Bernard L. Maddoff [sic] in December 2008. We respectfully request that all late filing penalties be abated.

Statement 9 reflects the following Corporate Stock holdings of the Foundation, among others, as follows:

Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC
Book Value: 696,072
Fair Market Value 400,000

The Foundation was continuing to carry on its books as of December 31, 2008 a value of $400,000 for the Madoff-affiliated securities firm. Query: in light of the fact that the filing of the 2008 Form 990-PF was made in November 2010 almost two years after the Madoff arrest and the wealth of information available about the Madoff bankruptcy/liquidation proceeding (the “Madoff Proceeding”), was the value reflected an anticipated amount recoverable or already recovered in the Madoff Proceeding by the Foundation?

The 2008 Form 990-PF reflected that the Foundation made charitable contributions aggregating $330,445 during 2008. It is unclear whether such contributions were made in whole or in part from cash distributions received by the Foundation from Madoff during 2008 before his arrest in December. Query: could any or all of such amounts be subject to “clawback” by Irving Picard, the Trustee in the Madoff Proceeding, as pointed out in Installment 40?

When the 2009 Form 990-PF for the Foundation is available, some of these issues may be further clarified.

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

[To be continued in Installment 42]  

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This is the thirty-eighth in a series of Installments on this blog that discusses issues that arose in the aftermath of the Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) scandal. Various Installments of this series have discussed the impact of the Madoff scheme on public charities and private foundations.

On October 21, 2010 Andrew M. Harris reported on Bloomberg.com that the U.S. Department of Labor has sued four investment firms for allegedly failing to examine Madoff’s business practices before entrusting him with hundreds of millions of dollars in pension funds. According to the Harris article, the action was brought under ERISA to restore to the plans all losses suffered as a result of alleged fiduciary breaches by the defendants related to Madoff investments.

One of the defendants in the Department of Labor action is Ivy Asset Management LLC, a unit of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (“Ivy”), which was discussed in Installment 34 of this series, insofar as Ivy was involved in the reported investment with Madoff of Howard Hughes Medical Institute. The Harris article and Installment 34 also noted that, in May 2010, the New York Attorney General sued Ivy and two former officers for allegedly misleading clients about Madoff-related investments. These two officers have also been named as defendants in the Department of Labor suit.

It is interesting to consider whether private foundations and their fiduciaries could become similar targets of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for having invested with Madoff. If a private foundation makes any investments that would financially jeopardize the carrying out of its exempt purposes, both the foundation and the individual foundation managers may become liable for excise taxes under Section 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code.

"Jeopardizing investments" generally are investments that show a lack of reasonable business care and prudence in providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the foundation for it to carry out its exempt function. No single factor determines a jeopardizing investment. Excise taxes of up to 35% percent of the amount involved (the jeopardizing investment) can be imposed on the foundation for each tax year, or part of a year that the jeopardy exists.

Additionally, an excise tax of up to 20% percent of the jeopardizing investment involved is also imposed on any foundation manager who knowingly, willfully and without reasonable cause participated in making and maintaining the jeopardizing investment.

These heavy excise taxes on private foundations and their fiduciaries are designed to discourage investments that endanger the charitable mission. The IRS should be considering imposing them in appropriate cases where fiduciaries of private foundations invested with Madoff, just as the Department of Labor is doing with pension funds. Otherwise the jeopardizing investment excise tax provisions have little teeth and are not useful in deterring such speculation.

[To be continued in Installment 39]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)

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This is the twenty-seventh in a series of Installments on this blog that discusses issues that arose in the aftermath of the Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) scandal. Against the backdrop of the Madoff scandal, Installment 26 of this series discussed certain disclosure requirements for public charities adopted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in its new Form 990 (the “New Form 990”) and contrasted such requirements with those of the Form 990-PF filed with the IRS by private charitable foundations. The Forms 990 and 990-PF (including those discussed in this Installment) are universally available on the Internet on Guidestar and other sites.

Installment 26 of this blog series observed that, for 2007, the Carl & Ruth Shapiro Family Foundation (the “Shapiro Foundation”) filed a Form 990-PF (the “Shapiro 990-PF”) and an amended Form 990-PF (the “Shapiro Amendment”). The Shapiro Amendment reflected a disappearance for the Shapiro Foundation of (i) $191,003,929 in fair market of assets and (ii) $38,953,906 in investment income previously reported in the Shapiro 990-PF. However, the Shapiro Amendment gave no explanation for the disappearances or that they had resulted from events that came to light in December 2008 and thereafter; even more troubling was the fact that the Shapiro Amendment contained no reference to Madoff whatsoever, even though the schedules in the original Shapiro 990-PF had referred to him 10 times by name.

The Shapiro Foundation filed its 2008 Form 990-PF with the IRS on November 20, 2009. Again, as in the Shapiro Amendment, no reference was made to the substantial investments with, or losses attributable to, Madoff.

This somewhat perplexing approach to disclosure adopted by the Shapiro Foundation regarding its involvement with Madoff is in stark contrast to the filing with the IRS on September 23, 2009, by the Judy & Fred Wilpon Family Foundation (the “Wilpon Foundation”) of its 2008 Form 990-PF (the “Wilpon Form 990-PF”). The Wilpon Form 990-PF did not merely disclose the fact that the Wilpon Foundation had investments with, and losses from, Madoff; the Wilpon 2008 Form 990-PF attached as Appendix A the Wilpon Foundation’s “Statement by Taxpayer Using the Procedures in Rev. Proc. 2009-20 to Determine a Theft Loss Deduction Related to a Fraudulent Investment Arrangement.” That Statement discloses the calculation of the Wilpon Foundation’s losses attributable to Madoff.

Each of the filings by the Shapiro Foundation and the Wilpon Foundation may be in compliance with current IRS requirements for Forms 990-PF; however, we are in an era of ever greater expectations by society for transparency in the operations and activities of charitable organizations. The Wilpon Foundation’s filing came much closer to achieving these expectations than the filings by the Shapiro Foundation.

As was stated in Installment 26, the IRS has greatly enhanced the quality of disclosure required in the New Form 990. It should review and consider revisions for the Form 990-PF to enhance consistency and transparency of reporting by private foundations and require more meaningful explanation of material matters and events.

[To be continued in Installment 28]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)

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The Supreme Court last week applied a newly-invigorated Confrontation Clause to deny the admission at trial of drug lab test certificates in an opinion which may unintentionally prove very useful to attorneys defending criminal tax cases.

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4734 (June, 25, 2009), the Court unremarkably extended the reach of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) to the test reports of crime laboratories, holding that the admission in a Massachusetts trial of a laboratory report showing that a seized substance was cocaine violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights; the State was obliged instead to produce witnesses in court to establish the drug's chain of custody and the testing conclusion. The dissent argued less forcefully that the majority's conclusion was unwarranted or surprising after Crawford, and more effectively that a practical consequence of the decision would be to strain the resources of crime labs everywhere.

But one legal argument posited by the four Justices in dissent was that the lab certificate of results was akin to a business records certificate offered under FRE 803(6), which, even after Crawford, may be admitted in the absence of a live witness. Justice Scalia, writing for the five-Justice majority, dismissed this comparison. First, the business of a crime lab is to produce evidence for use at trial and so it does not share the routineness and regularity of a true business, leaving the former's products -- drug test reports -- outside the scope of Rule 803(6). Second, true business records are neutrally created for the purpose of administering an entity, rendering them non-testimonial when offered in a criminal trial and thus outside the Confrontation Clause, while police lab reports are prepared specifically for use at such a trial and to inculpate a defendant, so are testimonial and subject to the Confrontation Clause. Id. at *31-33.

To further make its point, the majority contrasted non-testimonial clerks' certificates as to records located in a business or government office with "those cases in which the prosecution sought to admit into evidence a clerk's certificate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for a particular relevant record and failed to find it … the clerk's statement would serve as substantive evidence against the defendant whose guilt depended on the non-existence of the record for which the clerk searched. Although the clerk's certificate would qualify as an official record [in the sense of FRE 803(6) and 803(8)] the clerk was nonetheless subject to confrontation." Id. at *31.

In myriad criminal cases the government is required as an essential element to prove the absence of an official record in order to establish guilt, but perhaps this is most often true in tax prosecutions. Whether seeking to prove a misdemeanor failure to file returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7203, or a felony Spies tax evasion where an act in furtherance is the failure to file returns, 26 U.S.C. § 7201, the prosecutor typically relies on a certificate from the IRS records center that no return is on file for the given year(s). Defense attorneys can now use Melendez-Diaz to argue that any and all IRS personnel involved in the search for the missing filing must be called as live witnesses in court, since the IRS certificate of non-filing cannot be admitted without violating the defendant-taxpayer's constitutional right of confrontation.
 

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It is nearly an article of faith that, in negotiating a guilty plea to a Title 26 offense, the prosecutor and the CI agent working the case for the IRS will invariably agree to take into consideration in reaching a "tax loss" number for sentencing purposes a wide array of tax return considerations which effectively reduce the taxes due and owing. Chief among the considerations which traditionally serve to allow a reworking, and lowering, of the tax loss figure are deductions or credits which the target's attorney and/or accounting expert can identify as having been overlooked on the filed return. Occasionally, the argument that a target taxpayer should be allowed to alter filing status will serve to pave the way for agreement on a reduced tax loss.

But if plea negotiations fail, and the taxpayer now charged as a defendant pursues a similar formula for reducing "tax loss" before the court, the near-universal position of the federal courts is that those considerations are of no avail. In United States v. Clarke, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 6169 (11th Cir., March 20, 2009), the Eleventh Circuit joined the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that the "tax loss" calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 is the loss intended by the defendant and not the actual loss to the IRS, precluding consideration of overlooked and recalculated deductions or credits, or for altered filing status. Only the Second Circuit (United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 188 (2nd Cir. 2002)) requires the consideration of unclaimed deductions in calculating "tax loss" for sentencing purposes.
 

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