Investment Adviser Ivy Asset Management Settles Madoff Lawsuits for $210 Million - Installment 86

Michael J. Kline writes: 

 

On November 13, 2012, the U.S. Department of Labor (the “DOL”) issued a press release entitled “US Labor Department Recovers Nearly $220 Million for Madoff Victims.” On the same day New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman (the “NYAG”) issued a press release entitled “A.G. Schneiderman Obtains $210 Million Settlement With Ivy Asset Management In Connection With Madoff Ponzi Scheme.”  Both the DOL and the NYAG are to be congratulated and each press release refers to the other regulatory authority. However, it is not immediately clear that the press releases are addressing a single $220 million settlement with Ivy Asset Management (“Ivy”) and other defendants of a number of consolidated lawsuits in which the DOL and NYAG are principal plaintiffs. The settlement is pending approval by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.

 

An interesting statement in the NYAG press release is the following:

 

When added to future amounts Madoff investors anticipate receiving from the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding, today's settlement is expected to return all or nearly all the original investment to those defrauded by the Ponzi scheme in this case.

 

This statement should provide some measure of holiday comfort and joy to all Madoff victims who hold claims that have been allowed by Trustee Irving Picard in the Madoff bankruptcy proceeding. It should be especially satisfying to the members of the Wilpon/Katz/Mets/Sterling (collectively, “Wilpons”) consortium. As pointed out in Installment 85 of this blog series and many earlier Installments, the Wilpons’ timely and foresighted settlement with Picard may virtually absolve them of any out-of-pocket payments as a group to Picard in the Madoff proceeding.

 

One final observation on the Ivy matter. This blog series discussed in Installments 34 and 38 certain issues respecting Ivy that had surfaced in the summer of 2010 about the time that the NYAG and the DOL filed suit against Ivy. The interest in Ivy by this blog series earlier in 2010 had been triggered by the identification of Ivy as an investment adviser that appeared to have involved Howard Hughes Medical Institute (“HHMI”), in investing with Madoff. There has been no public information readily available to date as to the extent of the investment by HHMI with Madoff. Moreover, as discussed in Installment 29, it was clear that HHMI does not intend to provide voluntarily any light on the subject. Installment 29 did raise a question as to whether HHMI was required to provide such information in its Form 990 filed with the Internal Revenue Service. 

 

Almost four years after Madoff was arrested, his massive Ponzi scheme still has unresolved and undisclosed issues.

 

(Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and a co-author of this blog, is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics.)

 

 [To be continued in Installment 87]

Madoff and Private Foundations: Should the IRS Follow the Actions by the U.S. Department of Labor in Pursuing Fiduciaries? - Installment 38

This is the thirty-eighth in a series of Installments on this blog that discusses issues that arose in the aftermath of the Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) scandal. Various Installments of this series have discussed the impact of the Madoff scheme on public charities and private foundations.

On October 21, 2010 Andrew M. Harris reported on Bloomberg.com that the U.S. Department of Labor has sued four investment firms for allegedly failing to examine Madoff’s business practices before entrusting him with hundreds of millions of dollars in pension funds. According to the Harris article, the action was brought under ERISA to restore to the plans all losses suffered as a result of alleged fiduciary breaches by the defendants related to Madoff investments.

One of the defendants in the Department of Labor action is Ivy Asset Management LLC, a unit of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. (“Ivy”), which was discussed in Installment 34 of this series, insofar as Ivy was involved in the reported investment with Madoff of Howard Hughes Medical Institute. The Harris article and Installment 34 also noted that, in May 2010, the New York Attorney General sued Ivy and two former officers for allegedly misleading clients about Madoff-related investments. These two officers have also been named as defendants in the Department of Labor suit.

It is interesting to consider whether private foundations and their fiduciaries could become similar targets of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for having invested with Madoff. If a private foundation makes any investments that would financially jeopardize the carrying out of its exempt purposes, both the foundation and the individual foundation managers may become liable for excise taxes under Section 4944 of the Internal Revenue Code.

"Jeopardizing investments" generally are investments that show a lack of reasonable business care and prudence in providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the foundation for it to carry out its exempt function. No single factor determines a jeopardizing investment. Excise taxes of up to 35% percent of the amount involved (the jeopardizing investment) can be imposed on the foundation for each tax year, or part of a year that the jeopardy exists.

Additionally, an excise tax of up to 20% percent of the jeopardizing investment involved is also imposed on any foundation manager who knowingly, willfully and without reasonable cause participated in making and maintaining the jeopardizing investment.

These heavy excise taxes on private foundations and their fiduciaries are designed to discourage investments that endanger the charitable mission. The IRS should be considering imposing them in appropriate cases where fiduciaries of private foundations invested with Madoff, just as the Department of Labor is doing with pension funds. Otherwise the jeopardizing investment excise tax provisions have little teeth and are not useful in deterring such speculation.

[To be continued in Installment 39]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)

Ponzi Schemes and Charities: Malvern Preparatory School, its Former Trustee Joseph Forte and New Form 990 Disclosures - Installment 30

This is the thirtieth in a series of Installments on this blog that discusses issues that arose for charities in the aftermath of the Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) scandal.  For example, Installment 29 analyzed new disclosure requirements for public charities adopted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in 2008 for its new Form 990 (the “New Form 990”) against the backdrop of the Madoff scandal and its relationship to Howard Hughes Medical Institute (“HHMI”).  Forms 990 that are filed with the IRS, including the New Form 990 of HHMI and those discussed in this Installment, are universally available on the Internet on Guidestar and other sites.

Madoff, however, was not the only person to have operated an alleged Ponzi scheme that materially and adversely affected charities.  The Philadelphia Inquirer published an article by Harold Brubaker on July 7, 2010, entitled “A Workout in Court over Ponzi-scheme Gift.”  The Brubaker article reported that Malvern Preparatory School (“Malvern” or the “school”), among other charities, is claiming that it is a victim of a Ponzi-scheme run by its former Trustee Joseph S. Forte (“Forte”), even though the school had received hundreds of thousands of dollars in donations from him.  Malvern is a venerable 167-year old independent Catholic middle and high school for boys in Malvern PA.  Forte is reported to be serving a 15-year prison term for investment fraud, having pleaded guilty on June 5, 2009.

Mr. Brubaker stated that, unlike other Forte charities that have chosen to negotiate with the receiver for Forte’s estate on donated monies that the receiver is endeavoring to “clawback,” Malvern is suing to retain the money donated by Forte.  The Brubaker article explains that the basis of the Malvern claim for victim status is complicated:

The school, known for its sports programs, went into debt constructing a strength-and-conditioning center at Forte's urging and after he pledged $1 million to pay for it. But Forte only paid $500,000 of his pledge, according to the school, leaving Malvern Prep in debt for the rest. The school's June 30 [2010 lawsuit] filing asserted a counterclaim for $630,000, which includes $565,000 for a portion of a term loan needed to pay for the center plus $65,000 in fees and interest.

The facts in the Malvern case are unusual because Malvern was not just a charitable beneficiary of Forte as was the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, which was mentioned in the Brubaker article.  Nor was the school simply a direct or indirect investor with Forte as, for example, Hadassah and Yeshiva University were with Madoff, as reported in Installments 22 and 23 of this series.

The discovery of the Forte scandal, his guilty plea and conviction, the Securities and Exchange Commission actions, and the appointment of Marion A. Hecht, CPA, CFE, CIRA, CFF, and MBA, Managing Director of the forensic litigation and valuation division of Goodman & Company, LLP, as receiver for Forte’s assets, all occurred during Malvern’s fiscal year ended June 30, 2009 (“Fiscal 2009”). A review of the balance sheet in the New Form 990 dated February 9, 2010, filed by Malvern for Fiscal 2009 with the IRS (the “Malvern 2009 Form 990”) reveals a decline in the category of “Pledges Receivable” during Fiscal 2009 of approximately $1.2 million from $2,003,004 to $785,992.  Because there is no note or explanation by Malvern in the Malvern 2009 Form 990 regarding the category, it is impossible to tell whether all or any portion of the $500,000 Forte pledge was written off by the school during the Fiscal 2009.

Malvern’s financial association with Forte was a complex “hybrid” case in that Malvern not only received direct donations from Forte that were presumably proceeds from his investment scheme; in effect, Malvern also was a type of investor with him. Malvern dedicated the proceeds of Forte’s bounty for the purpose of the strength-and-conditioning center that the school was reluctant to build in the first place and, in doing so, incurred its own new debt in reliance upon the anticipated payment of the remainder of the Forte pledge. Therefore, Malvern has suffered a real investment loss from the failure of Forte to satisfy his $500,000 pledge to pay for the indebtedness incurred by the school to build the project that Forte had induced it to undertake.

It is somewhat perplexing that the Malvern 2009 Form 990 makes no mention of Forte or the fate of his personal pledge, although the Forms 990 filed by the school for the immediately prior two fiscal years clearly listed him among its Trustees.

The matter is further complicated by the fact that, as discussed in Installment 29 of this series, Part VI of New Form 990 entitled “Government, Management and Disclosure” has the following question on Line 5 for an answer of “Yes” or “No” by the organization: “Did the organization become aware during the year of a material diversion of the organization’s assets?”

In the Malvern 2009 Form 990, Line 5 was answered “No.”

The instructions for completing the New Form 990 (the “Form 990 Instructions”) provides the following, in part, as to Line 5:

Answer “Yes” if the organization became aware during the organization’s tax year of a material diversion of its assets, whether or not the diversion occurred during the year. If “Yes,” explain the nature of the diversion, amounts or property involved, corrective actions taken to address the matter, and pertinent circumstances in Schedule O, though the person or persons who diverted the assets should not be identified by name.

A diversion of assets includes any unauthorized conversion or use of the organization’s assets other than for the organization’s authorized purposes, including but not limited to an embezzlement or theft. . . .

For this purpose, a diversion is considered material if the gross
dollar amount (not taking into account restitution, insurance, or similar recoveries) exceeds the lesser of (1) $250,000 or (2) 5 percent of the lesser of the organization’s gross receipts for its tax year or total assets as of the end of its tax year.

If the decline in the Pledges Receivable in the Malvern 2009 Form 990 was attributable in part to a write-off of at least $250,000 of the outstanding $500,000 Forte pledge because of the repudiation of the Forte pledge by the receiver, the school should have considered making an explanation on Schedule O. If such a write-off of the Forte pledge did actually occur during Fiscal 2009, Malvern and its professional advisers apparently employed a narrow interpretation of the definition of “diversion of assets.”

While such a narrow interpretation may be supportable, I believe that the desirability of Malvern’s having taken a broader view of the term “diversion of assets” was heightened by the fact that Forte had been a Trustee of the school. As a matter of fact the Form 990 Instructions make a specific point that the category Pledges Receivable should include pledges of trustees, after any amounts estimated to be uncollectible:

Line 3. Pledges and grants receivable, Net. Enter the total
of (a) all pledges receivable, less any amounts estimated to be
uncollectible, including pledges made by officers, directors,
trustees, key employees, and highest compensated
employees and (b) all grants receivable.

As a final note, even if no write-off of all or a portion of the Forte receivable occurred during Fiscal 2009, in my view, Malvern should have considered making an explanation in the Malvern 2009 Form 990 as to why it was continuing to carry the Forte pledge in Pledges Receivable at full value.

In summation, the New Form 990 questions and Form 990 Instructions may need some refinement by the IRS to enhance the clarity and consistency of definitions and promote greater transparency by charities, as has been recommended in this and earlier Installments of this series.

[To be continued in Installment 31]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)

The Madoff Aftermath and Charities: The Curious Case of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute and its New Form 990 - Installment 29

This is the twenty-ninth in a series of Installments on this blog that discusses issues that arose in the aftermath of the Bernard L. Madoff (“Madoff”) scandal. Various Installments of this series have analyzed new disclosure requirements for public charities adopted by the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in 2008 for its new Form 990 (the “New Form 990”) against the backdrop of the Madoff scandal. The Forms 990, including the Form 990 (the “HHMI Form 990”) of Howard Hughes Medical Institute (“HHMI”) for the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009 (“Fiscal 2009”), are universally available on the Internet on Guidestar and other sites.

HHMI is one of the largest and most highly respected charitable organizations in the world, as a leading philanthropic organization dedicated to serving society through biomedical research and science education. On February 5, 2009, in the early aftermath of the arrest of Madoff in December 2008, HHMI was on a 163-page list of customer account names produced by the Madoff Bankruptcy Court and reproduced by many Web sites such as The New York Times.  In a commentary on every page of its list, The Times notes the following:

The list of customer account names found by the court-appointed trustee in the records of Bernard L. Madoff's wealth management firm, as well as names of people who contacted the trustee to say they believed they had been Madoff customers and wanted to file a claim. Some of the names on the list are those of lawyers, accountants, foundation trustees and agents who set up the accounts on behalf of the actual investors in the Madoff fund, which investigators are calling the biggest Ponzi scheme ever. Some people on the list have said publicly that they were included in error.

Other Madoff-related media reports respecting charities such as charitygovernance.com identified HHMI as having been a direct or indirect victim of Madoff.  Genetic Engineering & Biotechnology News published an article on March 15, 2009 on the effects of the Madoff scandal on life sciences research. It featured the following relative to HHMI:

Howard Hughes Medical Institute (HHMI) is looking resolutely forward. “That was long ago and far away,” VP for communications and public affairs Avice Meehan says of the Madoff scandal. “It will have no impact at all on our operations, although it has had consequences on the institutions where our researchers work. At HHMI, we’re assessing the result of the ongoing financial challenge on our endowments and operations. At this point, despite ongoing volatility, we expect to meet our commitment to our grantees, investigators, and Janelia Farm [Research Campus], and are proceeding with new initiatives with some degree of caution.”

Except for the aforementioned and similar items, there appears to be virtually no publicly available information as to the extent, if any, to which HHMI had direct or indirect exposure to losses with Madoff. There are no references to the Madoff matter in the HHMI Form 990, the on-line Annual Report of HHMI for Fiscal 2009 or the financial statements of HHMI for Fiscal 2009 audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP.

In light of the relatively scarce public information available and the stature and leadership position of HHMI in the charities field, I contacted HHMI to solicit clarification and information from them relative to the status of HHMI as a potential direct or indirect victim of Madoff. I was advised, “It has long been HHMI’s practice to decline comment on specific investments and we have decided, after some discussion, to adhere to that practice.”

The absence of any information in the HHMI Form 990 regarding losses by HHMI with Madoff is surprising in light of the changes made by the IRS in New Form 990. Part VI of the New Form 990, entitled “Government, Management and Disclosure” has the following question on Line 5 for an answer of “Yes” or “No” by the organization:

“Did the organization become aware during the year of a material diversion of the organization’s assets?” [Emphasis supplied] In the HHMI Form 990, Line 5 was answered “No” by HHMI.

The final revised instructions for completing the New Form 990 for 2008 (the “Form 990 Instructions”) provided the following, in part, as to Line 5:

Answer “Yes” if the organization became aware during the organization’s tax year of a material diversion of its assets, whether or not the diversion occurred during the year. If “Yes,” explain the nature of the diversion, amounts or property involved, corrective actions taken to address the matter, and pertinent circumstances in Schedule O, though the person or persons who diverted the assets should not be identified by name.

A diversion of assets includes any unauthorized conversion or use of the organization’s assets other than for the organization’s authorized purposes, including but not limited to an embezzlement or theft. . . .

For this purpose, a diversion is considered material if the gross
dollar amount (not taking into account restitution, insurance, or similar recoveries) exceeds the lesser of (1) $250,000 or (2) 5 percent of the lesser of the organization’s gross receipts for its tax year or total assets as of the end of its tax year. [Emphasis supplied]

In my view, it is likely that a diversion, if any, by Madoff of assets of HHMI would have been immaterial on a relative basis as compared to the $14 billion in endowment funds as of August 31, 2009 and the $3.5 billion decline of endowment funds during Fiscal 2009 reported by HHMI. However, relative immateriality is not the standard for disclosure under New Form 990. The standard for disclosure is the lesser of (1) $250,000 or (2) 5 percent of the lesser of the organization’s gross receipts for its tax year or total assets as of the end of its tax year.

In light of HHMI’s vast scale of operations and $14 billion investment portfolio, if HHMI had any diversion of assets attributable to Madoff, it would likely have not been less than the threshold for New Form 990 disclosure of $250,000. Perhaps there may be an explanation or interpretation for the non-disclosure by HHMI that is not readily evident from the materials publicly available; we would invite anew any clarifying comment from HHMI.

[To be continued in Installment 30]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., the author of this entry and author of an on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders. Mr. Kline is a partner with Fox Rothschild LLP, based in our Princeton, NJ office, and is a past Chair of the firm's Corporate Department. He concentrates his practice in the areas of corporate, securities, and health law, and frequently writes and speaks on topics such as corporate compliance, governance and business and nonprofit law and ethics)