Attorneys sued by SEC for issuing allegedly fraudulent Rule 144 opinion letters

Last week the Securities and Exchange Commission sued two California attorneys for issuing allegedly fraudulent legal opinions which allowed the holders of restricted Rule 144 stock in a communications company to sell their holdings prematurely (news release here). As set forth in the SEC's press release, attorneys Albert J. Rasch, Jr. and Kathleen R. Novinger violated the antifraud and registration provisions of the provisions of the 33' and 34' Acts, as well as Rule 10b-5, by falsely opining that the restricted stock of Mobile Ready Entertainment Corp. met the conditions necessary to enable its sale by insiders. In July 2008, the SEC had sued both Mobile Ready and its co-CEO's with having engaged in a pump and dump scheme using the restricted stock (news release here).

The SEC emphasized that it will hold securities lawyers to their functions as "gatekeepers" in the market, auguring further enforcement actions against attorneys whose conduct falls short of the SEC's standards.  However, no concurrent criminal prosecution of the attorneys was announced.
 

The Madoff Scandal and Charities and Foundations: The Need for All 501(c)(3) Entities to Improve their Governance and Conflicts of Interest Policies in Advance of Reports for 2008 on Form 990 to be Filed with the IRS - Installment 5

This is the fifth in a series of Installments on this blog that will discuss some of the threshold issues that face the manifold stakeholders who have been materially affected by the Bernard L. Madoff scandal, allegedly the longest, most widespread and financially devastating Ponzi scheme on record. All potential stakeholders should consult professional advisors promptly to have their positions evaluated.

We will continue the discussion of charitable entities and foundations that were affected by the Madoff scandal. However, we believe that the unfortunate experiences of too many charitable organizations and foundations (collectively, “501(c)(3) Entities”) that were directly involved in enormous losses from the Madoff morass should be poignant object lessons for all charitable organizations and their fiduciaries, whether or not victims of Madoff, especially in the year 2009, which is the first year of the expanded Form 990 that 501(c)(3) Entities must file with the IRS.

Potential Tax Penalties for Private Foundations that are 501(c)(3) Entities and Their Fiduciaries

On February 11, 2009, Lynnley Browning wrote an incisive article in The New York Times entitled, “For Investing with Madoff, Private Foundations Could Face Tax Fines.” In the article, Browning explains clearly the massive penalty excise taxes of 10 percent to which 501(c)(3) Entities that are classified as private foundations and their fiduciaries on a personal basis can be subject. Browning points out the following:

Under an obscure tax rule, private foundations can be penalized for failing to vet their investments properly, to heed red flags or to diversify properly. While foundations are exempt from federal income taxes, they are subject to excise tax,
intended to keep them from taking outsize risks that could threaten their very survival.

Browning goes on to explain that, “The foundation’s officers, directors and trustees also face a 10 percent penalty, and a 5 percent additional penalty if they ignored red flags or did not thoroughly vet Mr. Madoff’s investments and proposals.”

As indentified by Browning, the tax penalties for foundations can be monumental, especially when added to the basic losses that they incurred with Madoff directly. It is not clear, however, that the IRS would invoke the provisions, across-the-board, according to Browning.

Implications of Private Foundation Penalties for Governance Principles for All 501(c)(3) Entities

While the potential tax penalties that may flow to private foundations from Madoff investments is serious, the matter is not the primary thrust of this installment. Irrespective of whether or not private foundations are penalized for their investing with Madoff, the are numerous significant governance and compliance principles that may be extrapolated from the experience of 501(c)(3) Entities that invested with Madoff. The need to vet investments properly, heed red flags and diversify properly is mandatory for public charities as well as private foundations, even though public charities do not have the looming specter of IRS excise taxes for themselves and their fiduciaries.

This need for 501(c)(3) Entities to exercise appropriate care in its investing policy is heightened by the fact that 501(c)(3) Entities have a mission and a societal goal that was the basis for their receiving tax exempt status in the first place. The earning of income should only be a means to achieving the mission, not an end in itself. Losing sight of the mission and failing to maintain the highest standards can subject the 501(c)(3) Entities to harmful media publicity, public embarrassment, loss of donor support or even lawsuits by donors or regulatory authorities in flagrant cases of mismanagement.

The 501(c)(3) Entities and their boards are entrusted with the monies of donors that they have the obligation to safeguard reasonably. Such 501(c)(3) Entities must demonstrate their commitment to standards of appropriate governance with sufficient up-to-date compliance and governance codes, charters and/or programs that will provide protection for the 501(c)(3) Entities and guidance for their fiduciaries.

An Outline of Obligations of Fiduciaries of 501(c)(3) Entities and Some Failures with Respect to Madoff

Every officer, director and trustee of a 501(c)(3) Entity has a number of obligations and standards that are imposed upon them by statute or common law principles and business ethics. Such obligations and standards have become increasingly burdensome for uncompensated volunteers who serve as fiduciaries of 501(c)(3) Entities and in effect earn only “psychic income.” They are held to as standard of conduct that encompass many of the same principles and potential liabilities as fiduciaries of major corporations who are highly compensated. These principles and obligations include the following:

Honesty – the so-called business judgment rule that is the presumption that the fiduciary acted in the honest belief that actions taken were in the best interest of the 501(c)(3) Entity

Integrity – the obligation of a fiduciary to act consistently, reasonably and in good faith and to maintain confidentiality of proprietary information of the 501(c)(3) Entity

Loyalty – the obligation of a fiduciary to avoid conflicts of interest with the 501(c)(3) Entity

Responsibility – a fiduciary has a duty to exercise such diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent people would exercise under similar circumstances in the position

Citizenship – compliance with laws and understanding of the need for carrying on activities with ethical awareness

Fairness - relatively recent adoption in many states of “stakeholder” principles that encourage fiduciaries to take into account not only the interests of the direct beneficiaries of the 501(c)(3) Entity but also the interests of many constituencies, e.g. employees, customers, suppliers, the community, the government and others

A number of these principles were apparently not complied with by a number of 501(c)(3) Entities and their fiduciaries in the course of their investing with Madoff. Perhaps the most egregious case reported to date was of a highly respected Eastern university that invested, by its own admission, many millions of dollars with Madoff for years when he was a member of the board of trustees and an officer of the university. Madoff himself clearly violated virtually all of the obligations for fiduciaries listed above.

What is more concerning, however, is the fact that the other trustees of the university also did not comply with many of the obligations in the foregoing list, intentionally or because they were not sufficiently clear on their fiduciary duties. The obligations that such board members may have breached arguably include many elements of the list when appropriate questions are raised. For example, even if Madoff was investing in the exotic vehicles that he stated he was, were these the types of investments that a board charged with overseeing donations from the public should be condoning or even approving? Did the board members even understand or have the background or experience to understand the nature of the investments? Would they have invested in these vehicles for their own accounts? Did they have sufficient knowledge of the facts or ask Madoff legitimate questions to make a determination on the quality of the investments? Did the board members ever concern themselves with the potential appearance of impropriety of investing with Madoff when he was a fiduciary of the university? Did the board ask for an accounting as to how much Madoff or his affiliates earned in fees or other income from his relationship with the university? If they did ask any or all of these questions, is it sufficiently documented in the minutes of university board or committee meetings or other records?

As discussed in Installment 4, Madoff preyed upon the various business and tax advantages that many 501(c)(3) Entities saw in an investment with him. Then the 501(c)(3) Entities became subject to the glare of adverse publicity and embarrassing questions as to how and why the staggering losses that they suffered had taken place. This blog will continue the discussions as to how 501(c)(3) Entities should be dealing with lessons learned from the Madoff scandal, especially in preparing to meet their obligations in filing Forms 990 with the IRS for 2008.

[To be continued in Installment 6]
 

 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., for contributing this entry and for his on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders)

Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 ("FERA")

In the wake of the subprime crisis and economic crisis, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Senator Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) have recently introduced the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) to provide the federal government with more tools to investigate and prosecute financial fraud in the mortgage industry. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S.386, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). Section 2(a) and 2(b) of FERA broadens the definition in Title 18 of “financial institution” to include “mortgage lending business,” which is defined as “an organization … which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in real estate, including private mortgage companies and any subsidiaries” whose activities affect interstate commerce. Id.

The amendments assure that private mortgage brokers and companies are held accountable under federal fraud laws. Without the amendments, for example, the financial institution bribery statute would not extend beyond traditional banks and financial institutions. See 18 U.S.C. § 215; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud statute); 18 U.S.C. § 225 (continuing financial crimes enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (false statement, entry or record). The new definitions would also provide for greater sentences for institutions affected by mail and wire fraud.
Similarly, Section 2(c) of FERA would amend the false loan application statute (18 U.S.C. § 1014) to include making materially false statements or to willfully overvalue a property in order to influence any action by a “mortgage lending business.” Other changes proposed by the Section 2 of FERA include amending the federal major fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1031) and its enhanced penalties to include fraud associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) or any economic stimulus package and amending the securities fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1348) to include commodities fraud. See Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, S.386, 111th Cong. § 2(d)-(e) (2009).

Critics of Section 2 of FERA may argue that the bill is unnecessary and counterproductive. For example, the mail and wire fraud statutes already reach all fraud perpetuated against a “mortgage lending business” because those statutes are not limited to crimes involving financial institutions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. Also, any fraud associated with the TARP funds and any other economic relief can presently be prosecuted under the mail and wire fraud statutes. Id. The penalties under both statutes are severe, up to $1 million in fines and 30 years in prison.
With respect to Section 2(c) of FERA, the critics argue that amending § 1014 is unnecessary because the mortgage lending businesses do not operate in a vacuum, and any false statement made on a mortgage application to a mortgage lending business will eventually influence another organization along the financial or real estate spectrum. Critics also argue that amending the securities fraud statute to include commodities fraud is unnecessary because commodities fraud can be prosecuted under many statutes, like theft, embezzlement, mail and wire fraud statutes, and violations of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission regulations.

FERA is still in its initial stages of the legislative process. On February 11, 2009, a hearing took place in the Senate regarding the “The Need for Increased Fraud Enforcement in the Wake of the Economic Downturn.” While it remains to be seen whether the current version Section 2 of FERA actually becomes law, given the current economic crisis and political climate, some changes are likely to come, even if, as the critics claim, they are redundant and unnecessary.
 

(With appreciation to Amit Shah, Esq., for contributing this entry)

Stakeholders in the Madoff Scandal and Their Need to Act Promptly and Proactively - Installment 4

This is the fourth in a series of Installments on this blog that will discuss some of the threshold issues that face the manifold stakeholders who have been materially affected by the Bernard L. Madoff scandal, allegedly the longest, most widespread and financially devastating Ponzi scheme on record. All potential stakeholders should consult professional advisors promptly to have their positions evaluated.

We will continue the discussion of charitable entities and foundations that invested with Madoff. This series has already discussed in Installment 3 some generally accepted accounting principles specific to 501(c)(3) Entities that aided Madoff in extending the life and increasing greatly the scope of his operation. Hand in hand with the GAAP principles for 501(c)(3) Entities that assisted Madoff are federal income tax rules that are applicable to 501(c)(3) Entities.

Direct Entity Investors (“DEI”) that are charitable entities and foundations (“501(c)(3) Entities”)

Certain Income Tax Rules Applicable to 501(c)(3) Entities that Inured to the Benefit of Madoff

The most important tax principle for 501(c)(3) Entities that benefited Madoff is that their investment income is exempt from federal and state income taxes. Charities can therefore stay fully invested and roll over investment income into further investments. This was a powerful tool for Madoff. Because of the apparent safety, consistency and stability of his relatively high “returns,” Boards and Investment Committees of 501(c)(3) Entities would be disinclined to redeem either principal or “returns” in accounts with Madoff because they did not even have to pay taxes on their reported returns from Madoff. Such 501(c)(3) Entities would seek to use funds from other areas of their endowment funds to remain as fully invested as practicable with Madoff.

Madoff preyed upon the various business and tax advantages that many 501(c)(3) Entities saw in an investment with him. As a result Madoff was able to count on the fact that charities would be resistant to request redemptions of principal and would even reinvest their reported “returns” for a long period of time. It was only when the rest of the financial markets collapsed that 501(c)(3) Entities began to demand large distributions that Madoff could not meet. Then the 501(c)(3) Entities became subject to the glare of adverse publicity and embarrassing questions as to how and why the staggering losses that they suffered had taken place.

Summary of the benefits for Madoff’s operations of the credibility and stability that he projected to 501(c)(3) Entities
The next discussion in this series will focus on the proactive review and responses that 501(c)(3) Entities should be considering in governance and investment policies to the shocking losses and other harmful aftermath of investing with Madoff. Such a proactive review makes good sense for all 501(c)(3) Entities, irrespective of whether or not they were investors with Madoff. The increased regulatory scrutiny under which charities will be operating in the future makes “best practices” a necessity.

As a prelude to that discussion, it should again be observed that 501(c)(3) Entities have been on the lookout for many years for investment vehicles in which to place their endowment funds that appear to have a high degree of safety and stability and provide a consistent and relatively high rate of return. An investment with Madoff appeared to be ideal to many 501(c)(3) Entities on all of these levels, especially with his track record of 12% average annual returns over decades, combined with the added credibility flowing from the fact that many other highly respected 501(c)(3) Entities were also long time investors. Moreover, for 50 years Madoff had been a leader and innovator in the investment industry and had been Chairman of the NASDAQ Stock Market. This prominence enhanced his stature and trustworthiness as an investment advisor. Therefore, Boards and Investment Committees of many 501(c)(3) Entities felt comfortable with entrusting millions of their endowment dollars with Madoff for extended periods.

Such comfort was heightened by the fact that Madoff appeared to be one with them, that is, he was the epitome of the famous “Three W’s” that are the most desirable attributes for Board members of 501(c)(3) Entities: Wealth, Wisdom and Work. Madoff evidenced personal wealth and largesse in personally contributing large sums to numerous charities; he appeared to unselfishly share his wisdom, experience and business acumen with those 501(c)(3) Entities in which he was interested; and finally he was deeply involved in rising to leadership roles in charities because of his work effort and apparent wealth and wisdom. All of these factors, combined with the apparent business and tax benefits of an investment with Madoff for 501(c)(3) Entities, enhanced the scope and longevity of his enterprise.

The next Installment will continue the discussion of the aftermath of the Madoff scandal for 501(c)(3) Entities with an emphasis on the review and analysis on governance and investment policies that charitable organizations should be conducting to repair and/or enhance their standing among their peers and competitors for contributions.

[To be continued in Installment 5]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., for contributing this entry and for his on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders)

Stakeholders in the Madoff Scandal and Their Need to Act Promptly and Proactively - Installment 3

This is the third in a series of Installments that will discuss some of the threshold issues that face the manifold stakeholders who have been materially affected by the Bernard L. Madoff scandal, allegedly the longest, most widespread and financially devastating Ponzi scheme on record. All potential stakeholders should consult professional advisors promptly to have their positions evaluated.

We will continue by discussing Direct Entity Investors.

Direct Entity Investors (“DEI”) that are charitable entities and foundations (“501(c)(3) Entities”)

General

Perhaps the most perplexing and concerning group of Madoff victims is the long list of charitable organizations that have reportedly lost many millions of dollars in their endowment funds through investments with Madoff. A number of 501(c)(3) Entities have even been forced to abruptly cease their operations.

There are a number of reasons that Madoff may have targeted 501(c)(3) Entities as potential investors, some of which will be discussed in these Installments. The harm that has been inflicted upon many charities, with respect to finances and image, requires discussion beyond the level of other classes of Madoff victims. 501(c)(3) Entities occupy a unique position in society, as tax exempt organizations to which contributions are deductible, thereby imposing on their governing boards a higher standard for operating and investing. These boards have the responsibility for overseeing, protecting and dealing with contributions of others to serve charitable missions that society deems to be of high value. There are important principles on governance and compliance that may be drawn from the Madoff scandal, which should be considered by all 501(c)(3) Entities and their governing boards, whether or not they were direct or indirect investors with Madoff.

In recent years, legislators like Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the Ranking Member of the Senate Finance Committee, have been questioning whether charities, especially hospitals and colleges and universities are adequately carrying out their charitable missions at a sufficiently high level to warrant their continued favored tax exempt status. One of his principal criticisms is that these institutions are more interested in enhancing their endowment funds than spending such funds on the charitable missions that qualify them for tax-exempt status. The losses to charities with Madoff investments, some of which had appurtenant overtones of conflicts of interest, are almost certain to raise further calls for greater controls on tax exempt organizations and how they use and invest their endowment funds to achieve their charitable missions. The Madoff scandal greatly exacerbated the massive endowment losses in 2008 of 501(c)(3) Entities.
 

Charitable Involvements of Madoff

Madoff enhanced his reputation and standing in the community of wealthy potential investors by being a leader of and heavy contributor to highly visible charitable organizations. Such organizations included those with humanitarian, educational and religious missions. By identifying himself with such charities, Madoff was able to associate with wealthy individuals and leaders involved in foundations, business entities and government. This enabled him to get access to a diverse group of investors, including the charities themselves.

The investment by charitable organization with Madoff held certain advantages for Madoff in furtherance of his alleged Ponzi scheme. These include certain accounting rules and tax laws that are specific to public charities and private foundations.

Certain Accounting Rules Applicable to 501(c)(3) Entities that Inured to the Benefit of Madoff

The first accounting principle that is worthy of note in the Madoff context is the requirement under generally accepted accounting principles for 501(c)(3) Entities (“GAAP”) that 501(c)(3) Entities “mark investments to market.” Therefore, under this GAAP principle, unrealized gains and losses on investments by 501(c)(3) Entities are recognized on the income statement and the current value of investments is reflected on the balance sheet. This principle inured to the benefit of Madoff, because his reporting of consistently high, stable “returns” over years would encourage 501(c)(3) Entities to simply reinvesting and rolling over their Madoff “returns.” It became clear to Madoff than 501(c)(3) Entities would predictably seek to maintain the Madoff investments intact to get the maximum benefit for revenues on their income statements and balance sheet values. To the extent that a 501(c)(3) Entity needed endowment funds or returns, it would be inclined to draw upon assets other than Madoff investments. This in turn enhanced the ability of Madoff to extend the life of his enterprise by avoiding redemptions and even distribution of current “returns.”

Another GAAP principle that would inure to the benefit of Madoff is the requirement that financially credible pledges to 501(c)(3) Entities of multi-year gifts are all recognized as revenues in the year the pledge is first made. To the extent that donors or even Madoff himself expected to use Madoff investments to satisfy such multi-year pledges, the 501(c)(3) Entities would recognize the full amount of the gift in the year of the pledge and then receive interests in Madoff investments over a number of years to satisfy the pledges. Madoff would again benefit by the stability of the investment that would stay in place over years from the donor to the receiving 501(c)(3) Entity, which would be inclined to keep the investment in place for the reasons set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph.

The next Installment will continue the discussion of the aftermath of the Madoff scandal for 501(c)(3) Entities.

[To be continued in Installment 4]
 

 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., for contributing this entry and for his on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders)