Quid pro quo not required for Hobbs Act, Section 666 prosecutions
A public official who accepts a bribe from a developer, both cash and a plot of land, but does not explicitly reach agreement with the bribor on an official act to be performed by the recipient may still be convicted of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 18 U.S.C. § 666, according to the Sixth Circuit. United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2009).
Abbey, a Michigan city administrator, was found to have accepted cash and a subdivision lot from a developer. There was no evidence at trial that Abbey had, in return, agreed to perform a specific official act in exchange, that is, there was no quid pro quo. In a pretrial motion to dismiss, a Rule 29 motion, and on appeal Abbey contended that, absent a quid pro quo he could not be convicted for extorting the money and property "under color of official right." Only in the area of campaign contributions is the government required to prove a quid pro quo to ensure that an otherwise permissible activity is not criminalized unfairly (citing McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991)). In all other Hobbs Act areas, the government need only show knowledge by the defendant-official that he/she was expected to exercise some influence in favor of the bribor as opportunities to do so arose.
Likewise, under § 666, there is no requirement of proof of linkage between the thing of value given to the official and a specific official act. A conviction will be sustained on proof that the official merely intended to generally use his/her influence to benefit the bribor.
