CFO Has No Fiduciary Duty To Correct Another Officer's Statements To The Market

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals this week reaffirmed the limited circumstances under which a duty to disclose arises under Rule 10b-5, rejecting in a criminal case the Government’s theory that a fiduciary duty attaches to “high corporate executives” obliging them to correct alleged misstatements by others in management.

The case of United States v. Schiff, 2010 WL 1338141 (3d Cir., Apr. 7, 2010) involves the prosecution of two former top executives of Bristol-Myers Squibb. Frederick Schiff, former CFO, and Richard Lane, former president of a Bristol-Myers unit, were both indicted on conspiracy and securities fraud charges related to statements and alleged omissions in 2002 concerning the company’s business practice of incentivizing its wholesalers to purchase and inventory more products than were needed based on actual demand. The Government maintained that this practice fraudulently inflated corporate sales in the short term, and was covered up in public pronouncements to analysts and in the company’s filed financials.

On appeal was the district court’s dismissal of a Government theory that Schiff could be convicted for failing to correct misleading statements as to wholesale inventory levels made by Lane on analyst calls. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s rejection of any duty to speak in order to correct another’s statements, emphasizing that in only three scenarios does a duty to disclose arise: (a) insider trading; (b) a statutory requirement of disclosure; and (c) an inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior disclosure by the same individual. The notion of a generalized fiduciary obligation upon “high corporate officers” to correct others’ omissions or inaccuracies, what the Government also called a “corporate spokesman fiduciary duty,” finds no basis in 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) or Rule 10b-5.

The Court also addressed a Daubert ruling limiting the Government’s proof of the materiality of certain charged affirmative misstatements by the defendants. In so doing, it noted that the Government’s proposed use of an expert to link a stock-price drop to the making of certain statements was a “widely used” method of proof of materiality, but that a party could also rely on fact testimony from analysts or corporate employees that wholesale inventory levels were material to either investment decisions or financial forecasts.

Reading the Third Circuit's opinion is also commended in order to appreciate the district court’s very active, and detailed, management and criticism of the Government’s shifting and conflicting theories of prosecution. Defense counsel had not only obtained a constraining bill of particulars in the trial court, but persuaded the judge to extract stipulations from the Government to confine it to particular theories of securities fraud, leading to success on appeal and probably improving the prospects at the eventual trial.
 

Victim Of Securities Fraud Successfully Relies On SEC Protective Order To Shield Tax Information From IRS

There are a variety of circumstances under which investors may provide sensitive tax-related information to the Securities and Exchange Commission; they may be victims of securities fraud eager to assist the SEC in recovering lost monies or, under the SEC's newly-developed policy of encouraging and rewarding cooperation -- previously reported here -- they may be low-level participants in the fraud anxious to prove their bona fides.  No matter the scenario, the disclosing parties will desire protection against the further disclosure of their tax-related information to other arms of the government, such as the IRS.  The SEC may even, in the right circumstance, consent to a protective order to facilitate the disclosure.

But what assurance does the disclosing party have, even with a protective order in place, that the SEC will not turn around and re-disclose their information to a United States Attorney's Office or to the IRS for criminal prosecution?  Under a recent Tenth Circuit case, the answer is: "some."

In SEC v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd., 2010 WL 1039796 (10th Cir., Mar. 23, 2010), a victim-investor in the defendant entity turned over to the SEC confidential information pertaining to his income, and did so pursuant to two protective orders, the first for his deposition testimony, the second for his documents.  Both protective orders were explicit in regards to the subsequent use of the information -- the information could only be used for purposes of the SEC litigation and no other, and could only be disclosed to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Utah as necessary to the SEC action.  Imagine the investor's surprise when, shortly after his disclosures to the SEC, agents of the IRS initiated a criminal investigation of him by dropping summonses at his banks, law firms, and brokerages.  The investor moved for an order directing the return of his information; the United States intervened to seek a modification of the protective orders to permit broad disclosure.  The district court not only refused to order the return of the investor's materials, but it modified the protective orders nunc pro tunc to support the broader disclosure sought by prosecutors.

The Court of Appeals reversed, directing the return of the information and negating the modification.  It held that the prosecutors were barred under the terms of the original orders from further disclosing the information received from the SEC or from using the information other than in the SEC action.  The court said that "[a]llowing the government to breach the promises made in the protective orders would encourage similar improper conduct in the future and would discourage future civil litigants from relying on the government's promises."  Id. at *6.  While there are sections within Title 15 which generally allow the SEC to disclose information to the Attorney General, they are permissive, not mandatory, and so did not override the protective orders.  Id. at *8.

There is precedent holding that grand jury subpoenas, at least rebuttably, overcome any civil protective orders. E.g.,, In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2002).  The Tenth Circuit noted one such case from the Fourth Circuit, but distinguished it, since the IRS/prosecutors had in this instance been handed the protected information and had not compelled its disclosure through grand jury subpoena.  But it is clear in a number of Circuits, including the Third and Fourth, that the service by an AUSA of a grand jury subpoena upon the SEC would have compelled the production of this investor's data, protective orders or not.  In that light, the Merrill Scott case has limited utility.  Put another way, a protective order is better than nothing, but securing one for a client in jeopardy is no guarantee of a good night's sleep, for you or for the client.

 

SEC to formally invite and specifically reward cooperation for the first time

All United States Attorney's Offices have routinized the practice of cooperation and standardized their form of cooperation agreement which, following Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), specifies to a degree both the benefits of cooperation and the consequences for violation of the agreement.  In contrast, the Enforcement Division of the SEC has traditionally not had in place a formal practice of cooperation, with its promised benefits, much less achieved a standard form of such agreement. The former prosecutor now heading up the SEC's Enforcement Division plans to change that.

Before the AICPA National Conference on December 8, 2009, Director Robert Khuzami discussed the SEC's new “cooperation initiative.”  Khuzami explained that the agency will now seek to encourage cooperation in SEC investigations through a variety of methods, including cooperation agreements, which for the first time will provide for the prospect of reduced sanctions based on the timeliness of the decision of a subject to cooperate and the value of the information he or she provides.

Current criminal practices followed around the nation typically reward not only the first witness in the door with a cooperation agreement, but often confer the same benefit on a number of others subsequently passing through the same portal. As a result of the proliferation of cooperation arrangements in any given investigation or prosecution, the Sentencing Commission reports, between September 2008 and October 2009 nearly 26% of all sentences were imposed below the Guidelines range as a result of government-sponsored departures.  In contrast, Khuzami's statements indicate that his agency will offer the benefits of cooperation far more parsimoniously. News reports from the AICPA conference quoted him as warning defense attorneys that "only one client can be first" in coming to the SEC with information.

Perhaps Khuzami intended only to create a rush to the SEC's door, much as federal prosecutors often attempt artificially to precipitate haste by claiming to limit the availability of cooperation deals. And perhaps the SEC will in practice relax the first-in-time requirement, much as prosecutors have relented in the interests of pragmatism. But if the Enforcement Director is taken at his word, then practitioners have cause to consider the need for speed in their clients' decision-making in civil securities fraud investigations.

 

Stakeholders in the Madoff Scandal and Their Need to Act Promptly and Proactively - Indirect Stakeholders - Installment 9

This is the ninth in a series of installments on this blog that is discussing some of the issues that face the manifold stakeholders that have been materially affected by the long global Ponzi scheme of Bernard L. Madoff. All potential stakeholders should consult professional advisors promptly to have their positions evaluated.

Installments 3 through 8 of this series focused on the specific concerns of charities that were victims of Madoff and similar schemes and advocated that every charity should respond pro-actively in the wake of the Madoff scandal and the current adverse economic climate, whether or not it was a Madoff victim itself.

We will now undertake a discussion of the concerns of an Indirect Individual Investor (“III”) who has been embroiled in the Madoff scandal not as a result of a direct investment with him The III may have invested in an entity that was either (i) a fund, investment manager or other vehicle, such as one of the well-publicized hedge funds that were “feeders” for Madoff, or (ii) an investment vehicle, such as a partnership or limited liability company, that was formed for the express purpose of aggregating sufficient funds from multiple investors to meet the minimum investment thresholds established by Madoff from time to time. There can be other permutations or combinations of these types of entities. Each of these types of entities will be defined in this series as a Direct Entity Investor (“DEI”).

This series will not address in detail the potential tax issues facing the III, as there has been extensive discussion in numerous other publications and internet postings on the tax consequences flowing from losses on investments with Madoff.

As is true of the Direct Individual Investor (“DII”) with Madoff who was discussed in early installments of this blog series, the III should be doing or have already done a number of things. However, the effort by the III must be on two levels: his or her investment in the DEI and the DEI’s investment in turn with Madoff

The III should collect every scrap of hard copy, digital or electronic information and communication that can be located relative to the investment in the DEI and the DEI’s investment with Madoff (collectively, “III Investment”), including statements, financial or otherwise, from the DEI or Madoff, tax statements such as Forms 1099 from the DEI, annual reports, press releases or other media statements by the DEI or Madoff as to the nature of the investments and returns, etc. Such information will prove to be valuable in identifying the scope of the loss by the III and the sequence of events that gave rise to the loss.

The III has many more complex issues, however, that the DII, who only has to deal with the records relating to a direct investment with Madoff. The III must seek out all formation documents filed with state agencies relative to the DEI and any agreements, such as partnership agreements and operating agreements, DEI tax returns, brokerage reports, DEI tax returns, copies of checks or other records of all payments respecting the III to and from the DEI, requests for distributions by the III, records of the DEI regarding its investments with Madoff and distributions from Madoff, if any. The DEI partnership, operating or similar agreement with its IIIs as to the provision of information and other rights of the IIIs and their III interests is of paramount importance.

To the extent that the DEI is not fully forthcoming with information requested by III or is unable to locate records regarding the III Investment, the III should contact the managers of the DEI in writing or by other means that will evidence the communication to the DEI and its date. Should the III not receive a meaningful response, he or she should contact an attorney or other competent professional to advise on the matter.

[To be continued in Installment 10]
 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., for contributing this entry and for his on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders)

 

Attorneys sued by SEC for issuing allegedly fraudulent Rule 144 opinion letters

Last week the Securities and Exchange Commission sued two California attorneys for issuing allegedly fraudulent legal opinions which allowed the holders of restricted Rule 144 stock in a communications company to sell their holdings prematurely (news release here). As set forth in the SEC's press release, attorneys Albert J. Rasch, Jr. and Kathleen R. Novinger violated the antifraud and registration provisions of the provisions of the 33' and 34' Acts, as well as Rule 10b-5, by falsely opining that the restricted stock of Mobile Ready Entertainment Corp. met the conditions necessary to enable its sale by insiders. In July 2008, the SEC had sued both Mobile Ready and its co-CEO's with having engaged in a pump and dump scheme using the restricted stock (news release here).

The SEC emphasized that it will hold securities lawyers to their functions as "gatekeepers" in the market, auguring further enforcement actions against attorneys whose conduct falls short of the SEC's standards.  However, no concurrent criminal prosecution of the attorneys was announced.
 

The Madoff Scandal and Charities and Foundations: The Need for All 501(c)(3) Entities to Improve their Governance and Conflicts of Interest Policies in Advance of Reports for 2008 on Form 990 to be Filed with the IRS - Installment 5

This is the fifth in a series of Installments on this blog that will discuss some of the threshold issues that face the manifold stakeholders who have been materially affected by the Bernard L. Madoff scandal, allegedly the longest, most widespread and financially devastating Ponzi scheme on record. All potential stakeholders should consult professional advisors promptly to have their positions evaluated.

We will continue the discussion of charitable entities and foundations that were affected by the Madoff scandal. However, we believe that the unfortunate experiences of too many charitable organizations and foundations (collectively, “501(c)(3) Entities”) that were directly involved in enormous losses from the Madoff morass should be poignant object lessons for all charitable organizations and their fiduciaries, whether or not victims of Madoff, especially in the year 2009, which is the first year of the expanded Form 990 that 501(c)(3) Entities must file with the IRS.

Potential Tax Penalties for Private Foundations that are 501(c)(3) Entities and Their Fiduciaries

On February 11, 2009, Lynnley Browning wrote an incisive article in The New York Times entitled, “For Investing with Madoff, Private Foundations Could Face Tax Fines.” In the article, Browning explains clearly the massive penalty excise taxes of 10 percent to which 501(c)(3) Entities that are classified as private foundations and their fiduciaries on a personal basis can be subject. Browning points out the following:

Under an obscure tax rule, private foundations can be penalized for failing to vet their investments properly, to heed red flags or to diversify properly. While foundations are exempt from federal income taxes, they are subject to excise tax,
intended to keep them from taking outsize risks that could threaten their very survival.

Browning goes on to explain that, “The foundation’s officers, directors and trustees also face a 10 percent penalty, and a 5 percent additional penalty if they ignored red flags or did not thoroughly vet Mr. Madoff’s investments and proposals.”

As indentified by Browning, the tax penalties for foundations can be monumental, especially when added to the basic losses that they incurred with Madoff directly. It is not clear, however, that the IRS would invoke the provisions, across-the-board, according to Browning.

Implications of Private Foundation Penalties for Governance Principles for All 501(c)(3) Entities

While the potential tax penalties that may flow to private foundations from Madoff investments is serious, the matter is not the primary thrust of this installment. Irrespective of whether or not private foundations are penalized for their investing with Madoff, the are numerous significant governance and compliance principles that may be extrapolated from the experience of 501(c)(3) Entities that invested with Madoff. The need to vet investments properly, heed red flags and diversify properly is mandatory for public charities as well as private foundations, even though public charities do not have the looming specter of IRS excise taxes for themselves and their fiduciaries.

This need for 501(c)(3) Entities to exercise appropriate care in its investing policy is heightened by the fact that 501(c)(3) Entities have a mission and a societal goal that was the basis for their receiving tax exempt status in the first place. The earning of income should only be a means to achieving the mission, not an end in itself. Losing sight of the mission and failing to maintain the highest standards can subject the 501(c)(3) Entities to harmful media publicity, public embarrassment, loss of donor support or even lawsuits by donors or regulatory authorities in flagrant cases of mismanagement.

The 501(c)(3) Entities and their boards are entrusted with the monies of donors that they have the obligation to safeguard reasonably. Such 501(c)(3) Entities must demonstrate their commitment to standards of appropriate governance with sufficient up-to-date compliance and governance codes, charters and/or programs that will provide protection for the 501(c)(3) Entities and guidance for their fiduciaries.

An Outline of Obligations of Fiduciaries of 501(c)(3) Entities and Some Failures with Respect to Madoff

Every officer, director and trustee of a 501(c)(3) Entity has a number of obligations and standards that are imposed upon them by statute or common law principles and business ethics. Such obligations and standards have become increasingly burdensome for uncompensated volunteers who serve as fiduciaries of 501(c)(3) Entities and in effect earn only “psychic income.” They are held to as standard of conduct that encompass many of the same principles and potential liabilities as fiduciaries of major corporations who are highly compensated. These principles and obligations include the following:

Honesty – the so-called business judgment rule that is the presumption that the fiduciary acted in the honest belief that actions taken were in the best interest of the 501(c)(3) Entity

Integrity – the obligation of a fiduciary to act consistently, reasonably and in good faith and to maintain confidentiality of proprietary information of the 501(c)(3) Entity

Loyalty – the obligation of a fiduciary to avoid conflicts of interest with the 501(c)(3) Entity

Responsibility – a fiduciary has a duty to exercise such diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent people would exercise under similar circumstances in the position

Citizenship – compliance with laws and understanding of the need for carrying on activities with ethical awareness

Fairness - relatively recent adoption in many states of “stakeholder” principles that encourage fiduciaries to take into account not only the interests of the direct beneficiaries of the 501(c)(3) Entity but also the interests of many constituencies, e.g. employees, customers, suppliers, the community, the government and others

A number of these principles were apparently not complied with by a number of 501(c)(3) Entities and their fiduciaries in the course of their investing with Madoff. Perhaps the most egregious case reported to date was of a highly respected Eastern university that invested, by its own admission, many millions of dollars with Madoff for years when he was a member of the board of trustees and an officer of the university. Madoff himself clearly violated virtually all of the obligations for fiduciaries listed above.

What is more concerning, however, is the fact that the other trustees of the university also did not comply with many of the obligations in the foregoing list, intentionally or because they were not sufficiently clear on their fiduciary duties. The obligations that such board members may have breached arguably include many elements of the list when appropriate questions are raised. For example, even if Madoff was investing in the exotic vehicles that he stated he was, were these the types of investments that a board charged with overseeing donations from the public should be condoning or even approving? Did the board members even understand or have the background or experience to understand the nature of the investments? Would they have invested in these vehicles for their own accounts? Did they have sufficient knowledge of the facts or ask Madoff legitimate questions to make a determination on the quality of the investments? Did the board members ever concern themselves with the potential appearance of impropriety of investing with Madoff when he was a fiduciary of the university? Did the board ask for an accounting as to how much Madoff or his affiliates earned in fees or other income from his relationship with the university? If they did ask any or all of these questions, is it sufficiently documented in the minutes of university board or committee meetings or other records?

As discussed in Installment 4, Madoff preyed upon the various business and tax advantages that many 501(c)(3) Entities saw in an investment with him. Then the 501(c)(3) Entities became subject to the glare of adverse publicity and embarrassing questions as to how and why the staggering losses that they suffered had taken place. This blog will continue the discussions as to how 501(c)(3) Entities should be dealing with lessons learned from the Madoff scandal, especially in preparing to meet their obligations in filing Forms 990 with the IRS for 2008.

[To be continued in Installment 6]
 

 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq., for contributing this entry and for his on-going analysis of the concerns of Madoff stakeholders)

Stakeholders in the Madoff Scandal and Their Need to Act Promptly and Proactively - Installment 1

The Madoff investment scandal was allegedly the longest, most widespread and financially devastating Ponzi scheme on record. On almost a daily basis since the arrest of Bernard L. Madoff on December 11, 2008, there are new disclosures of victims and classes of victims. Over the next few days this blog will discuss some of the threshold issues that face the manifold stakeholders who have been materially affected by the Madoff scandal. In many cases there may be limited time for victims to act to protect themselves to the maximum. Some of the potential self-protective actions will be identified during the course of identifying the stakeholders. All potential stakeholders should consult professional advisors promptly to have their positions evaluated.

Direct Individual Investors (“DII”)

This class of victim may be the largest in numbers, although not necessarily in potential dollar losses. A DII should collect every scrap of hard copy, digital or electronic information and communication that can be located relative to an investment in Madoff (a “Madoff Investment”), including statements, financial or otherwise, from Madoff, tax statements such as Forms 1099, annual reports, statements by Madoff as to the nature of the investments and returns, etc. Such information may prove to be valuable in isolating the scope of the loss and the factual basis that gave rise to the loss. The factual basis may determine whether or not the DII is a potential class plaintiff should any classes be certified in actions against Madoff and/or his controlled business entities.

Other immediate concerns for DII include the mailing on January 2, 2009, by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPC”) of formal claims packages to potential claimants of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, a licensed broker-dealer affiliate of Madoff. The liquidation case is set in the Southern District of New York. Claims by customers must be filed with the trustee in the liquidation case, not SIPC, by March 4, 2008. The notice from SIPC relates to claims of customers of the broker-dealer who may have lost money or securities registered in “street name” or in the process of being registered. It does not relate to investors who may have lost money in the alleged Ponzi scheme that was extraneous to the broker-dealer.

Another immediate consideration for DII are potential claims for refunds that may be filed with federal and state taxing authorities. Generally the statute of limitations for the filing of refunds is a three-year period from the filing date of the original income tax return. For example, in the case of a taxpayer who filed his or her federal and state returns on April 15, 2006 for a 2005 calendar year, no claims for refund can be made after April 15, 2009. Since the income reflected on Forms 1099 that were supplied to DII cannot be correct to the extent there was negligible real income earned from the investment with Madoff, taxes paid based on the Forms 1099 were excessive and can be available for refunds.

[To be continued in Installment 2]
 

 

(With appreciation to Michael J. Kline, Esq. for contributing this entry)